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CALIFORNIA'S ANTI-SLAPP LEGISLATION: A
SUMMARY OF AND COMMENTARY ON ITS
OPERATION AND SCOPE
Kathryn W. Tate*
In 1992 the California legislature enacted section 425.16 of
California's Code of Civil Procedure' in order "to encourage contin-
ued participation in matters of public significance" and to prevent the
chilling of such participation "through abuse of the judicial proc-
ess."2 When a lawsuit is brought for the purpose of chilling such
participation, that lawsuit has been dubbed a SLAPP (Strategic Law-
suit Against Public Participation).3 Section 425.16 permits a special
motion to strike in any SLAPP suit4 and freezes discovery.5 The
statute is thus designed to prevent SLAPPs by ending them early and
without great cost to the SLAPP target. Another aspect of the provi-
sion's deterrence is the entitlement of the prevailing movant to attor-
ney's fees and costs.
6
In 1993, the California legislature amended the statute to re-
quire, in part, that the Judicial Council report back "on the frequency
* Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. B.S. 1960,
George Williams College; J.D. 1976, University of Arizona. Thanks to my
Loyola colleague, Professor Gary Williams, and to Mark Goldowitz, Esq., Di-
rector of the California Anti-SLAPP Project, for their thoughtful comments
concerning drafts of this Article.
1. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (West Supp. 2000).
2. Id. § 425.16(a). The statute became effective January 1, 1993. See
CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 425.16 Historical and Statutory Notes.
3. Professor George W. Pring first coined this term. See George W. Pring,
SLAPPs: Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, 7 PACE ENVTL. L.
REv. 3, 4 (1989).
4. See CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE § 425.16(a). Specifically, section 425.16(a)
permits the special motion to strike in any lawsuit "brought primarily to chill the
valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the
redress of grievances." Id.
5. See id. § 425.16(g).
6. See id. § 425.16(c).
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and outcome of special motions made pursuant to this section, and on
any other matters pertinent to the purposes of this section.",7 The
publication of both this reportO and the first California Supreme
Court decision interpreting section 425.16, which was decided in
1999,9 prompted this Article, the purpose of which is to examine the
provision after seven years of judicial rulings.
Part I of the Article will provide general background on SLAPP
suits and the need for anti-SLAPP legislation. Part II will detail the
legislative history of California's anti-SLAPP provision. Part III will
review the judicial interpretations of section 425.16, beginning with
an overview of how the statute operates and then highlighting the is-
sue that was resolved by the 1999 California Supreme Court deci-
sion. This section will also review the reaction of the federal courts
to section 425.16. Part IV will summarize the Judicial Council re-
port, including certain recommendations for amendments to the stat-
ute. Finally, Part V will highlight any remaining issues in the opera-
tion and scope of section 425.16. Appendices to the Article will also
provide the complete text of the statute, a summary of circumstances
where motions have been granted and denied, and a fuller discussion
of the Judicial Council's and the author's comments on the recom-
mended amendments to the statute.
I. BACKGROUND
In addition to the meaning behind the acronym SLAPP, "Strate-
gic Lawsuit Against Public Participation,"'10 these suits have been de-
scribed as actions without substantial merit brought against individu-
als or groups with the intention of "silencing [the] opponents, or at
least... diverting their resources."'" The lawsuits have the effect of
7. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(i) (West Supp. 1994) (ordering the re-
port by January 1, 1998).
8. See generally JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, LEGISLATIVE RE-
PORT: SPECIAL MOTIONS TO STRIKE STRATEGIC LAwSUITS AGAINST PUBLIC
PARTICIPATION ("SLAPP SUrTS") (1999) [hereinafter JUDICIAL COUNCIL
SLAPP REPORT].
9. See Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity, 19 Cal. 4th 1106,
969 P.2d 564, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 471 (1999).
10. See Pring, supra note 3, at 3.
11. John C. Barker, Common-Law and Statutory Solutions to the Problem
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interfering with the defendants' past or future exercise of constitu-
tionally protected rights.' 2 More than one author has also provided a
more specific definition of a SLAPP suit. The seminal article on
SLAPP suits by George W. Pring identifies a SLAPP suit as: "1. a
civil complaint or counterclaim (for monetary damages, and/or in-
junction), 2. filed against non-governmental individuals, and/or
groups, 3. because of their communications to a government body,
official, or the electorate, 4. on an issue of some public interest or
concern."' 13 The amount of petitioning activity sufficient to satisfy
part 3 of the definition can be and has been limited elsewhere to in-
clude only one or a combination of administrative, judicial, or legis-
lative communications.' 4 Another way to determine if a lawsuit is a
SLAPP suit is to apply a two-part test suggested by another author:
"[A] SLAPP suit (1) is based on the exercise of certain First
Amendment petitioning rights, where such exercise is invited by
statute or a tradition of petitioning on the issues, and (2) is unlikely
to succeed on the merits."' 15
Both the Pring definition and the two-part test suggest that
plaintiffs bring SLAPP suits in response to an individual's or group's
exercise of the right to speak out on a public issue. Thus, SLAPP
suits can follow such simple communications as writing a letter to a
newspaper, testifying at a public hearing, lobbying a government of-
ficial, or circulating a petition.16 The injury wrought by the SLAPP
suit lies primarily in its being brought at all. The motive of SLAPP
filers-or "SLAPPers"--is not to win, but rather to chill the defen-
dants' activities of speech or protest and to discourage others from
of SLAPPs, 26 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 395, 396 (1993).
12. See Scott E. Mollen, SLAPP Suits - Award of Attorney's Fees and Ex-
penses Under 22 NYCRR Part 130-1 for Frivolous Conduct, Based on Prosecu-
tion of Colorable Claim for Improper Purpose, Not Unconstitutional, N.Y. L.J.,
June 3, 1992, at4.
13. Pring, supra note 3, at 4.
14. See Thomas A. Waldman, Comment, SLAPP Suits: Weaknesses in First
Amendment Law and in the Courts' Responses to Frivolous Litigation, 39 UCLA
L. REv. 979, 1045 (1992) (citing Protect Our Mountain Env't, Inc. v. District
Court, 677 P.2d 1361, 1369 (Colo. 1984)).
15. Id. at 1044.
16. See Dora A. Corby, Clearing Up Civil Procedure Section 425.16-De-
livering the Final Knockout Punch to SLAPP Suits, 29 McGEoRGE L. REv.
459, 459 (1998).
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similar activities. 17  The enormous damage amounts claimed by
SLAPPers can intimidate an unsophisticated defendant,' 8 as can the
specter of staggering defense costs, even though SLAPPers lose
eighty to ninety percent of the suits that actually go to trial.' 9
SLAPP suits "masquerade as ordinary lawsuits" and thus are not
easy to recognize, even by the courts.20 They can be brought as a
counterclaim or cross-claim in a given action, 2' as a separate action
following the dismissal of another party's original suit,22 or as an
initial action against a party who has acted in opposition to the suing
party's interests by means other than litigation.23 The most frequent
17. See Barker, supra note 11, at 403.
18. See id. (noting that the average damage amount sought in SLAPP suits
is $9.1 million).
19. See id. at 406.
20. Pring, supra note 3, at 8-9.
21. See, e.g., Wilcox v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. App. 4th 809,33 Cal. Rptr. 2d
446 (Ct App. 1994). Wilcox arose from another lawsuit in which certain court
reporters sued an association of court reporters (California Reporting Alliance
(CRA)) alleging that CRA's exclusive contracts were a tortious interference with
business relationships. See id. at 814, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 448. Wilcox was not a
party to the lawsuit, but she contributed money to support the litigation and
drafted a memorandum to other court reporters seeking litigation funds and char-
acterizing the lawsuit as accusing CRA of "extortion and racketeering." Id. at
814, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 448-49. CRA then filed a cross-complaint for defamation
against Wilcox in the original suit. See id. at 814, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 449.
22. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Superior Court, 168 Cal. App. 3d 1138, 214 Cal.
Rptr. 740 (Ct. App. 1985). In Sierra Club, the Sierra Club was able to delay a
developer's construction by securing a remand to the California Coastal Commis-
sion after successfully arguing that an incorrect administrative standard had been
used in approving the developer's permit See id. at 1140, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 741.
However, on remand, the Commission again voted in favor of the developer, us-
ing the appropriate standard. See id. at 1143, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 743. Thereafter,
the developer sued the Sierra Club for malicious prosecution based on the action
that resulted in the remand. See id. at 1144, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 744.
23. See, e.g., Evans v. Unkow, 38 Cal. App. 4th 1490, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 624
(Ct App. 1995). Evans was a former member of the board of directors for a
sanitary district in East Palo Alto who lost a recall election. See id. at 1493-94, 45
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 626. A recall election petition-circulated by the defendants stated
that Evans had, inter alia, spent more of the district's money on official parties,
travel, and finery than on needed repairs to sewers; had hired friends as consult-
ants; refused to test industrial sewage for arsenic; failed to make various repairs to
the system, which endangered the health of mostly low-income people; and at-
tempted to hire his personal attorney to represent the district See id. at 1494, 45
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type of SLAPP suit is for defamation, but the causes of action are
myriad. They include business torts (such as interference with
contractual rights or with prospective economic advantage), anti-
trust, intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of pri-
vacy, civil rights violations, constitutional rights violations, con-
spiracy, nuisance, judicial process abuse, and malicious prosecu-
tion.24
Because of the motives behind the SLAPP action, the usual ju-
dicial safeguards were seen as inadequate because they focused on
preventing a meritless claim from prevailing.25 A SLAPP plaintiff,
however, expects to lose and is willing to write off litigation
expenses (and even the defendant's attorney's fees where necessary)
as the cost of doing business. Thus, the existing safeguards did
not serve as a deterrent, given that the SLAPP plaintiffs real moti-
vation was delay and diversion to enable the project at issue to be
approved, or even completed, before the course of litigation was
concluded.26
Early judicial review of SLAPP litigation came to be the most
important deterrent of SLAPP actions. Quick resolution of the mat-
ter would greatly diminish a SLAPP's intimidation effect because a
dismissal could be granted before the defendant would be forced ei-
ther to pay substantial attorney fees for discovery and other defense
costs, or to bear the stress of the specter of a large judgment for an
extended period of time.27 One solution taken by some states has
been to adopt a statutory scheme that addresses the need for expe-
diting judicial review, as well as monetary recovery, for the party
who has been SLAPPed.28 California is one of a growing number of
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 626. After his recall, Evans sued the defendants for defamation
and libel. See id.
24. See Barker, supra note 11, at 402-03 & n.34.
25. See id. at 407-48 (discussing comprehensively the weaknesses of the
procedural and substantive protections existing before anti-SLAPP legislation,
such as summary judgment and a SLAPP-back suit, or a claim by the SLAPP
target, or "SLAPPee").
26. See id. at 406-07.
27. See id. at 408-09.
28. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 3211(g), 3212(h) (McKinney 1999); N.Y. Civ.
RIGHTS LAW §§ 70-a, 76 (McKinney 1999); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-33-1 to 9-33-4
(1997); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 4.24.500,4.24.510,4.24.520 (1999).
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states that have enacted such legislation.29  The next Section de-
scribes California's anti-SLAPP statute.
II. CALIFORNIA'S ANTI-SLAPP PROVISION
A. Section 425.16's Legislative History
It took the California legislature three tries before it finally
passed SB 1264,30 the Lockyer Bill (now California Code of Civil
Procedure section 425.16), which became effective January 1,
1993.3 1 The legislature included in the statute specific findings con-
cerning the need for this legislation:
The Legislature finds and declares that there has been a
disturbing increase in lawsuits brought primarily to chill the
valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of
speech and petition for the redress of grievances. The Leg-
islature finds and declares that it is in the public interest to
encourage continued participation in matters of public sig-
nificance, and that this participation should not be chilled
through abuse of the judicial process.32
The report of the Assembly's Judicial Subcommittee also de-
scribed the purpose of the bill:
Existing law does not specifically address the growing,
and frequently, [sic] criticized phenomena of SLAPP suits.
29. See GEORGE W. PRING & PENELOPE CANAN, SLAPPs: GETTING SUED
FOR SPEAKING OUT 189 (1996) (noting that eight other states have such legis-
lation: Delaware, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New York,
Rhode Island, and Washington); Gail Diane Cox, Pushing the SLAPP Enve-
lope, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 19, 1999, at Al (reporting that 11 other states have an
anti-SLAPP law: Delaware, Georgia, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Ne-
braska, Nevada, New York, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, and Tennessee, and that
Colorado has a state supreme court ruling allowing a SLAPPee to win a sum-
mary judgment if the suit arises from the exercise of the right to petition).
30. See Barker, supra note 11, at 448-49.
31. Although wide majorities in both legislative houses passed the earlier
versions of the Lockyer Bill, two governors, Deukmejian and Wilson, vetoed
those earlier bills. Finally, in 1992, after the legislature reworked the bill to
meet Governor Wilson's objections, it was signed into law. See id.; Corby, su-
pra note 16, at 460-61.
32. CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 425.16(a) (West Supp. 1994).
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This bill states that a cause of action against a person
arising out of the person's exercise of his or her constitu-
tional rights of petition and free speech "in connection with
a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike,"
unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established
that there is a "probability" that the plaintiff will prevail on
the claim.
Defendants who prevail on the motion to strike are en-
titled to attorney fees and costs. This provision does not
apply to "enforcement actions" brought by public prosecu-
tors. Plaintiffs may be awarded attorney fees if the court
determines that the special motion to strike was "frivolous"
or "solely intended to cause unnecessary delay."
Upon the filing of a special motion to strike, discovery
shall be stayed, unless authorized by the court.33
The legislature made minor amendments to the provision in
1993, including the directive that the Judicial Council provide the
legislature with a report on the usage of the provision, as well as
"any other [pertinent] matters" concerning the statute's purpose.34
By 1996, after several years of judicial interpretation of section
425.16, conflicting opinions developed in the courts of appeal as to
the scope of the section. 35  Therefore, in 1997, Senator Lockyer
33. ASSEMBLY SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY, STATUTORY SUMMARY AND INTERPRETATION OF SB
1264, at 2-3 (June 29, 1992).
34. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(i); see supra note 7 and accompanying
text. In addition, the language of section 425.16(c) concerning the court's
awarding of costs and attorney's fees to a plaintiff was changed from "may
award" to "shall award" where a motion to strike was found to be frivolous or
solely for delaying purposes. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 425.16(c).
35. Compare, e.g., Zhao v. Wong, 48 Cal. App. 4th 1114, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d
909 (Ct. App. 1996) (holding statute only applies to limited activities, such as
those involving the right of petition and free speech), disapproved by Briggs v.
Eden Council for Hope and Opportunity, 19 Cal. 4th 1106, 969 P.2d 564, 81
Cal. Rptr. 2d 471 (1999), with, e.g., Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim, 42
Cal. App. 4th 628, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 620 (Ct. App. 1996) (holding statute ap-
plies to any exercise of the right to seek redress of grievances from the gov-
ernment, including the filing of a private lawsuit). See also infra notes 100-21
and accompanying text.
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shepherded SB 1296,36 an amendment to section 425.16, through
unanimous approval by both legislative houses and by the governor.
The amendment's purpose in large part was to make explicit in the
section's declaration of legislative purpose that the section was to be
construed broadly.37 Another key amendment was the addition of a
fourth category of explicitly protected rights of petition and free
speech.35 This addition was intended to clarify that the statute's
protections applied to both statements and conduct.39
Most recently, in the fall of 1999, the legislature enacted two
new provisions to the statute which were to take effect immedi-
ately.40 First, they added a section making an appeal possible from
any order granting or denying a special motion to strike in order "to
further the purpose of the anti-SLAPP statute.",4 1 The legislature be-
lieved that "[w]ithout this ability [to immediately appeal], a defen-
dant will have to incur the cost of a lawsuit before having his or her
right to free speech vindicated." 42 Second, the amendments require a
36. See SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, CALIFORNIA SENATE, COMMITTEE
ANALYSIS OF SB 1296 (May 13, 1997).
37. See CAL. Clv. PROC. CODE § 425.16(a) (West Supp. 1997) (last sentence
added: "To this end, this section shall be construed broadly.").
38. See id. § 425.16(e)(4) (adding the category "any other conduct in further-
ance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional
right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public inter-
est").
39. Before the 1997 amendments, the enumerated categories in section
425.16(e) described only conduct that involved written or oral communica-
tions. Compare CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(e) as enacted in 1993, witi id.
as amended in 1997. This amendment was intended to ensure that the section was
interpreted in conformity with Ludwig v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. App. 4th 8, 18-
20, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 350, 357-59 (Ct. App. 1995), which found that the scope of
section 425.16 included both communicative and non-communicative conduct.
See SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, CALIFORNIA SENATE, COMMITTEE
ANALYSIS OF SB 1296, at 3-4.
40. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(j)-(k) (West Supp. 2000).
41. Id. § 425.160). A concomitant amendment was made to the California
Code of Civil Procedure specifying that an appeal may be had from an order
denying or granting a special motion to strike. See id. § 904.1(a)(13).
42. ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY, COMMITTEE
ANALYSIS OF AB 1675, at 2 (Apr. 20, 1999); accord SENATE JUDICIARY
COMMITTEE, CALIFORNIA SENATE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1675, at 4
(June 29, 1999). In its consideration of the amendment on granting immediate
appeal, the legislature also noted:
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party filing a section 425.16 special motion to strike and any oppo-
nent of that motion to submit certain documents to the Judicial
Council. 43 The amendments further require the Judicial Council to
maintain these materials as a public record for at least three years.
44
This mandated filing of information with the Judicial Council per-
taining to all special motions to strike should allow better tracking of
the use and effectiveness of the anti-SLAPP statute, something that
was not possible until now.
When a meritorious anti-SLAPP motion is denied, the defendant un-
der current law, has only two options. The first is to file a writ of ap-
peal, which is discretionary and rarely granted. The second is to de-
fend the lawsuit. If the defendant wins, the Anti-SLAPP Law is
useless and has failed to protect the defendant's constitutional rights.
Since the right of petition and free speech expressly granted by the
U.S. Constitution are at issue when these motions are filed, the defen-
dant should have the same right to appeal as plaintiffs already have
under current law and have the matter reviewed by a higher court.
ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY COMMITITEE, CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY, COMMITTEE
ANALYSIS OF AB 1675, at 2-3 (Apr. 20, 1999); accord SENATE JUDICIARY
COMMITTEE, CALIFORNIA SENATE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1675, at 4
(June 29, 1999).
43. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(k)(1). The specific documents re-
quired to be filed are copies of the endorsed-filed caption page of the motion or
opposition and any related notice of appeal or petition for a writ, and a con-
firmed copy of any order issued under section 425.16, including orders grant-
ing or denying a special motion to strike, discovery and attorney's fees. See id.
44. See id. § 425.16(k)(2). At the time the 1999 amendments were first pro-
posed by the Assembly Judiciary Committee, the Judicial Council had not
submitted to the legislature the report that section 425.16(i) required. See
ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY, COMMITTEE
ANALYSIS OF AB 1675, at 2, item (9) (Apr. 20, 1999) (noting that no report had
been submitted). However, by the time the Assembly had approved the bill and
passed it to the Senate, the Judicial Council report was available to the legislators.
See SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, CALIFORNIA SENATE, COMMITTEE
ANALYSIS OF AB 1675, at 4-5 (June 29, 1999) (discussing the Judicial Council
report). See generally JUDICIAL COUNCIL SLAPP REPORT, supra note 8. In its
analysis of the bill, the Senate Judiciary Committee noted that while the Judi-
cial Council had concluded in its report that no further data collection was
needed, the consultants hired by the Council had recommended that if the
legislature wanted reliable data about the operation of the anti-SLAPP statute,
it should "[a]t a minimum... require the filing of a simple form whenever the
[special] motion is entered." SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, CALIFORNIA
SENATE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1675, at 5 (June 29, 1999) (quoting
JUDICIAL COUNCIL SLAPP REPORT, supra note 8, at 4).
45. As will be more fully discussed in Appendix 3, the Judicial Council's
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However, this mandate does not require the Judicial Council to
do anything more than maintain the records for the set period of
time; there is no requirement of a report to the legislature similar to
the 1993 amendment.46 It is therefore unclear what use will be made
of the information. Moreover, the information-gathering itself may
not be fully effective unless the Judicial Council publicizes this re-
quirement to the courts and sets up procedures to ensure that attor-
neys for both filers and defenders of special motions to strike are
aware of the document submission requirement.47
B. The Current Statute
Section 425.16 provides specific protections to SLAPP targets-
or SLAPPees--because of the special burdens they face. Through
data collection efforts for its 1999 report were ineffective and provided incom-
plete information about the operation of the anti-SLAPP statute. See infra
notes 339-49, 356-59 and accompanying text.
46. Compare CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(k)(2) (West Supp. 2000), with
CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 425.16(i) (West Supp. 1994). Since the 1999 amend-
ment, the Judicial Council has been maintaining a log of the section 425.16 spe-
cial motion filings, which can be accessed on the California courts' Web site.
As of this Article's publication date, 74 filings had been made. See SLAPP Spe-
cial Motion Log, available at California Courts: Reference: Courts-How to Use
(last modified May 10, 2000) <http'//www.courtinfo.ca.gov/reference/
4_courtshowto.htm#SLAPPs>.
47. Instructions for transmitting the required documents to the Judicial
Council by fax or as e-mail attachments can be found on the California courts'
Web site. See How to Transmit and Access Documents Related to Special
Motions to Strike Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs)
(last modified Jan. 6, 2000) <http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/reference/
documents/transmit.pdf>. When the instructions were first posted, in Novem-
ber 1999, the information was featured on the courts' home page for the first
month. See E-mail from Jacquelyn Harbert, Judicial Council, Administrative
Office of the Courts, Research and Planning Unit to author (Jan. 4, 2000) (on
file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review). Currently, once one gets to
the home page, one must figure out to click on the "Reference" icon; from the
reference page, one must enter the table of contents at the "Courts: How to
Use" section, which contains a heading titled "Special Motions to Strike Stra-
tegic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs)." The complete Web
address to get to where one can click on the filing instructions is
<http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/reference/4-courtshowto.htm#SLAPPs> (visited
Apr. 27, 2000). Telephone assistance for document transmission is available at
415-865-7454; the fax number is 415-865-4332.
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the special motion to strike procedure, 48 the statute shifts the mo-
ment for judicial intervention back from the summary judgment
stage to the motion to dismiss stage,49 thus reducing the overall time
involvement. The statute also suspends discovery upon filing of the
special motion to strike in order to forestall excessive discovery costs
and the intimidating effect of ponderous pretrial discovery requests,
although limited discovery may be permitted if the plaintiff makes a
noticed motion and shows good cause. 0 The statute permits suc-
cessful SLAPPees to recover litigation costs and attorney's fees upon
dismissal, yet it also provides for attorney's fees and costs for the
plaintiff if the motion to strike is found to be frivolous or solely
48. Governor Wilson vetoed an earlier version of this anti-SLAPP legislation,
SB 2313, which structured the protections differently by proposing a special
"pleading hurdle" for potential plaintiffs. See Barker, supra note 11, at 448. It
specified thatprior to pleading a SLAPP suit, a plaintiff would have to demon-
strate to the court the "substantial probability" of plaintiff s success on the merits.
The Lockyer bill changed the burden and the procedure. Plaintiffs may now file a
SLAPP suit without special permission from the court. See CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 425.16 (West Supp. 2000). The SLAPP defendant then has 60 days to
file the special motion to strike. See id. § 425.16(f). The plaintiff's only burden
in response to such a motion is to demonstrate the "probability" of success on the
merits. See id. § 425.16(b)(1). The change from a "pleading hurdle" to a man-
datory special motion to strike was made pursuant to the request of the State Bar's
Committee on the Administration of Justice. Their concern was the potential for
violation of the plaintiffs constitutional right to a jury trial. See ASSEMBLY
SUBCOMMITrEE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY,
STATUTORY SUMMARY AND INTERPRETATION OF SB 1264, at 2-3 (June 30,
1992).
49. Section 425.16(f) provides:
The special motion may be filed within 60 days of the service of the
complaint or, in the court's discretion, at any later time upon terms it
deems proper. The motion shall be noticed for hearing not more than
30 days after service unless the docket conditions of the court require
a later hearing.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(f). One attorney for a SLAPPee has suggested
that the motion filing deadline of 60 days after the filing of a complaint is too
restrictive, especially if a defendant turns over the lawsuit to the defendant's
insurance carrier. In such cases, the deadline may pass before the carrier can
act, and rights may be lost if a late motion request is not granted. See JUDICIAL
COUNCIL SLAPP REPORT, supra note 8, Attachment 8 (Letter from Everett L.
Skillman to James Brighton and Gregory Loarie, Judicial Council of California
(Jan. 23, 1998)).
50. See CAL. Clv. PROC. CODE § 425.16(g); infra notes 211-19 and accompa-
nying text
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intended for delay.51 Lastly, the 1999 amendment to the statute al-
lows for immediate appeal by whichever party loses the motion to
strike. 52 For the SLAPP defendant, this is crucial in order to avoid
having to incur the cost of the full lawsuit before the constitutional
rights issue is fully adjudicated. The current statute is quoted in full
in Appendix 1.
It is of note that section 425.16 provides protection beyond the
traditional scope of anti-SLAPP legislation, which is focused on
protecting the right to petition. Under the more traditional scope of
such legislation, the right to free speech is protected only in the con-
text of the right to petition. 3 The California legislature, however,
has made clear that, in addition to protection of the right to petition,
protection of free speech regarding a public issue divorced from pe-
titioning is also within the scope of section 425.16. While many of
51. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 425.16(c); infra notes 221-39 and accompa-
nying text.
52. See CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE § 425.160); infra notes 240-42 and accompa-
nying text.
53. Examples of states with more typical anti-SLAPP statutes include:
Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 8136-8137 (West Supp. 1990) (direct-
ing the granting of a motion to dismiss where movant demonstrates that the
"[a]ction, claim, cross-claim, or counterclaim subject to the motion is an action
involving public petition and participation," unless the motion's opponent
demonstrates that "[t]he cause of action has a substantial basis in law" or that
existing law should be modified); Minnesota, MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 554.03
(West Supp. 2000) (providing immunity for "[l]awful conduct or speech that is
genuinely aimed in whole or in part at procuring favorable government action.
.. unless the conduct or speech constitutes a tort or a violation of a person's
constitutional rights"); and Washington, WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 4.24.510
(West Supp. 2000) (offering protection only to "[a] person who in good faith
communicates a complaint or information to any agency of federal, state, or
local government, ... regarding any matter reasonably of concern to that
agency" for "[c]laims based upon the communication to the agency"). See also
PRING & CANAN, supra note 29, at 203 (providing in their model anti-SLAPP
bill that protection be afforded for "[a]cts in furtherance of the constitutional
right to petition, including seeking relief, influencing action, informing, com-
municating, and otherwise participating in the processes of government... ex-
cept where not aimed at procuring any governmental or electoral action, result,
or outcome").
54. In its statement of findings concerning the need for section 425.16, the
legislature noted its concern over increased lawsuits "brought primarily to chill
the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition
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the reported California SLAPP cases involve a right to petition sce-
nario,5" there have been less typical SLAPP case situations,5 6 and the
for the redress of grievances." CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(a) (emphasis
added). The legislature was also careful to specify that the acts protected by
the statute included speech and conduct acts that are broader than speech or
conduct done as part of petitioning activity. See id. § 425.16(e)(3)-(4) (defin-
ing the acts as inclusive of "any written or oral statement or writing made in a
place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public
interest" and "any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitu-
tional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection
with a public issue or an issue of public interest"); see also Cox, supra note 29,
at Al1 (quoting George W. Pring as saying, "What Californians decided to do,
bless their hearts, was to cover not only the right to petition but all free
speech").
55. In describing the typical SLAPP scenario, the court in Wilcox v. Supe-
rior Court stated:
The paradigm SLAPP is a suit filed by a large land developer against
environmental activists or a neighborhood association intended to chill
the defendants' continued political or legal opposition to the develop-
ers' plans. SLAPPs, however, are by no means limited to environ-
mental issues, nor are the defendants necessarily local organizations
with limited resources.
27 Cal. App. 4th 809, 815, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 446, 449 (Ct App. 1994) (citations
omitted).
56. See, e.g., DuPont Merck Pharm. Co. v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. App. 4th
562, 564, 566, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 755, 757, 758 (Ct. App. 2000) (involving a
corporate defendant who moved to strike plaintiffs class action that alleged,
inter alia, the dissemination of false and misleading information about a phar-
maceutical product in "advertising, marketing, and public relations activities
directed at the medical profession and the general public"); Rogers v. Home
Shopping Network, Inc., 57 F. Supp. 2d 973 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (involving media
defendant who moved to strike plaintiffs libel complaint for false statements
in an article); Marich v. QRZ Media, Inc., 73 Cal. App. 4th 299, 86 Cal. Rptr.
2d 406 (Ct App. 1999) (involving media defendants who moved to strike par-
ents' claims arising out of a television show featuring ride-along coverage of
the discovery of their son's body and telephonic notification to the parents of
the son's death); Averill v. Superior Court; 42 Cal. App. 4th 1170, 50 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 62 (Ct App. 1996) (involving homeowner who moved to strike chari-
table organization's slander action based on her statements to her employer re-
questing that the employer discontinue support of charity).
In Marich, the court acknowledged that the case was not the type of
SLAPP suit described in Wilcox v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. App. 4th 809, 33
Cal. Rptr. 2d 446 (Ct App. 1994). See discussion supra note 55. The court
noted that the plaintiffs "[had] challenged the application of section 425.16 in
the trial court" but had not pursued the issue on appeal. Marich, 73 Cal. App.
4th at 307 n.3, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 412 n.3.
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judicial interpretations have made clear that speech apart from peti-
tioning activity is protected by the statute.57
III. REVEW OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF SECTION 425.1658
Early challenges to the constitutionality of section 425.16 were
unsuccessful. The statute has withstood arguments that it deprived
a plaintiff of equal protection, violated the right to a jury trial, and
denied due process by precluding discovery.59 Moreover, despite
arguments by SLAPPers that section 425.16 protects only private
citizens, the courts have applied the statute to SLAPPees in-
cluding corporations,6° politicians and their supporters,61 contri-
butors to political organizations, 62 labor unions, 63 tenant counseling
57. See Lafayette Morehouse, Inc. v. Chronicle Publ'g Co., 37 Cal. App.
4th 855, 864, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 46, 51 (Ct App. 1995) (finding that news re-
porting about governmental hearing is free speech protected by section
425.16); accord Braun v. Chronicle Publ'g Co., 52 Cal. App. 4th 1036, 1045,
61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 58, 62 (Ct App. 1997).
58. In California, the supreme court can order a court of appeal opinion not
to be published. This is commonly referred to as "depublication." See CAL. R.
CT. 976(c)(2); Joseph R. Grodin, The Depublication Practice of the California
Supreme Court, 72 CAL. L. REv. 514 (1984). Once a case is depublished, it
usually cannot be cited as authority in any other action. See CAL. R. CT.
977(a). A number of the SLAPP court of appeal decisions have been depub-
lished. However, since this Article's purpose is to provide an overview of the
full use and judicial interpretation of section 425.16, the author has chosen to
cite and discuss SLAPP decisions even where they have been depublished.
59. See Lafayette Morehouse, 37 Cal. App. 4th at 865-70, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 52-55; Dixon v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. App. 4th 733, 746, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d
687, 696 (Ct App. 1994); see also 5 B.E. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE,
Pleading § 964, at 429 (4th ed. 1997 & Supp. 1999) [hereinafter WITKIN
PROCEDURE].
60. See DuPont Merck Pharm. Co. v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. App. 4th 562,
92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 755 (Ct. App. 2000) (protecting pharmaceutical company's
activities); Marich, 73 Cal. App. 4th 299, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 406 (protecting me-
dia entities' activities); Sipple v. Foundation for Nat'l Progress, 71 Cal. App.
4th 226, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 677 (Ct App. 1999) (protection of publisher's activi-
ties); Lafayette Morehouse, 37 Cal. App. 4th 855, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 46 (pro-
tecting of corporate newspaper's activities).
61. See Beilenson v. Superior Court, 44 Cal App. 4th 944, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d
357 (Ct App. 1996).
62. See Matson v. Dvorak, 40 Cal. App. 4th 539, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 880 (Ct
App. 1995).
63. See Monterey Plaza Hotel v. Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees
ANTI-SLAPP LEGISLATION
organizations 6 4 and government entities and their representatives.
65
The statute's protection has even been afforded to someone who did
not personally petition a governmental agency but who was allegedly
behind others' petitioning activity.66
The California Courts of Appeal have applied section 425.16 in
a variety of contexts since its enactment. 7 A review of those cases
shows that, for the most part, the appellate courts have interpreted
section 425.16 in the spirit of the legislative history of the statute.
Thus, they have recognized that SLAPP suits are not brought to vin-
dicate legitimate rights, but "rather to interfere with the defendant's
ability to pursue his or her interests," and that the SLAPP suit
"achieve[s] its objective if it depletes defendant's resources or en-
ergy.",68  Most courts have therefore been willing to use section
425.16 as the legislature had intended-as a procedural remedy to
resolve a lawsuit expeditiously69-- but only if the SLAPPee meets
the burden of showing the lawsuit is within the provision's coverage
and the SLAPPer fails to show a probability of prevailing on the
Local 483, 69 Cal. App. 4th 1057, 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 10 (Ct App. 1999).
64. See Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity, 19 Cal. 4th 1106,
969 P.2d 564, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 471 (1999).
65. See Mission Oaks Ranch, Ltd. v. County of Santa Barbara, 65 Cal. App.
4th 713, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1 (Ct App. 1998), disapproved on other grounds by
Briggs, 19 Cal. 4th 1106, 969 P.2d 564, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 471; Bradbury v. Su-
perior Court, 49 Cal. App. 4th 1108, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d207 (Ct. App. 1996).
66. See Ludwig v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. App. 4th 8, 17, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d
350, 357 (Ct. App. 1995) ("[t]here is no requirement that the writing or speech be
promulgated directly to the official body").
67. There has also been one California Supreme Court case that dealt sub-
stantively with section 425.16. See Briggs, 19 Cal. 4th 1106, 969 P.2d 564, 81
Cal. Rptr. 2d 471. Briggs resolved a conflict between several court of appeal
decisions as to section 425.16's scope. See infra notes 100-21 and accompa-
nying text. Two other California Supreme Court cases have referred only gen-
erally to section 425.16's coverage. See Rosenthal v. Great W. Fin. Serv.
Corp., 14 Cal. 4th 394, 411-12, 926 P.2d 1061, 1071, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 875, 885
(1996) (comparing section 425.16 with CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE §§ 1281.2,
1290.2); College Hosp., Inc. v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 4th 704, 718, 882 P.2d
894, 902, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 898, 907 (1994) (comparing section 425.16 with
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.13).
68. Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim, 42 Cal. App. 4th 628, 645, 49 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 620, 629-30 (Ct App. 1996); accord Wilcox v. Superior Court, 27 Cal.
App. 4th 809, 815-17,33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 446,450 (Ct App. 1994).
69. See Church of Scientology, 42 Cal. App. 4th at 645, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
630.
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claims asserted. 70 After a few courts narrowly interpreted the scope
of the statute,7' the legislature recognized the split among the courts
of appeal72 and enacted the 1997 amendment to make explicit that
the courts are to construe section 425.16 broadly.
73
This Part will summarize the interpretations of the various cases
as they provide guidance on the procedural use and applicability of
section 425.16.
70. Appendix 2 provides a summary of the situations where the courts have
found the SLAPPee's burden met or not met
It should be noted that when the lawsuit is in the form of a separate action
that a SLAPPer brings against a SLAPPee, the SLAPPer will be the plaintiff and
the SLAPPee the defendant However, as noted in Part I (Background), SLAPP
actions can be in other forms. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text In
such instances, the SLAPPer might be the defendant in the underlying suit who
brings a counterclaim against the plainti, who would then be the SLAPPee. In
one California case, the SLAPPee was a non-party. See Wilcox, 27 Cal. App. 4th
at 814-15, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 449. The 1997 amendment to section 425.16 made
explicit that the statute applies to such other action forms. See SENATE
JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, CALIFORNIA SENATE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIs OF SB
1296 (May 13, 1997); CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 425.16(h) (West Supp. 1997)
("For purposes of this section, 'complaint' includes 'cross-complaint' and 'peti-
tion,' 'plaintiff includes 'cross-complainant' and 'petitioner,' and 'defendant' in-
cludes 'cross-defendant' and 'respondent"').
71. See Linsco/Private Ledger, Inc. v. Investors Arbitration Servs., Inc., 50
Cal. App. 4th 1633, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 613 (Ct App. 1996); Ericsson GE Mobile
Communications, Inc. v. C.S.I. Telecomms. Eng'rs, 49 Cal. App. 4th 1591, 57
Cal. Rptr. 2d 491 (Ct App. 1996); Zhao v. Wong, 48 Cal. App. 4th 1114, 55 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 909 (Ct App. 1996). Briggs disapproved each of these decisions. See
19 Cal. 4th 1106, 969 P.2d 564, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 471; see also supra notes 100-21
and accompanying text Briggs also disapproved Mission Oaks Ranch, Ltd. v.
County of Santa Barbara, 65 Cal. App. 4th 713, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1 (Ct App.
1998), to the extent it accepted Ericsson's analysis.
72. See ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY,
COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1296, at 4 (July 2, 1997); SENATE JUDICIARY
COMMITTEE, CALIFORNIA SENATE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1296, at 4
(May 13, 1997).
73. See SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, CALIFORNIA SENATE, COMMITTEE
ANALYSIS OF SB 1296, at 3-4 (May 13, 1997); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §
425.16(a) (West Supp. 1997) (adding a final sentence: "To this end, this section
shall be construed broadly").
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A. The Special Motion to Strike Procedure
The statute provides that the SLAPPee may file a special motion
to strike "within 60 days of the service of the complaint" 74 or later if
the court deems it proper.75 The motion must be noticed for hearing
within thirty days after its service unless the court's docket requires a
later date.76 As in a summary judgment motion, the pleadings in a
section 425.16 case merely frame the issues to be decided. However,
"a party cannot simply rely on the allegations in its own pleadings,
even if verified, to make the evidentiary showing" necessary to sup-
port or rebut a section 425.16 motion.77 Thus, similar to a summary
judgment motion, it is typical that the parties to a section 425.16 mo-
tion will submit affidavits to accompany and support their motion
filings. By these submissions, the SLAPPer will be attempting
to demonstrate a prima facie case against the SLAPPee, and the
SLAPPee will be attempting to rebut that showing. "In making its
determination, the court shall consider the pleadings, and supporting
and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or
defense is based,, 78 but this determination does not involve a
weighing of the evidence. 79 Rather, the court will accept all evi-
dence as true and decide if the SLAPPer has made a sufficient
showing of a probability that the claim will prevail at trial.80 If the
trial court grants the SLAPPee's motion to strike, a court of appeal
74. As part of the 1997 amendment, the legislature more fully defined the
term"complaint" to include cross-complaints and petitions. See supra note 70.
75. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(f) (West Supp. 2000). In Globetrotter
Software, Inc. v. Elan Computer Group, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1129 (N.D.
Cal. 1999), the court interpreted the statutory filing deadline as running from
the filing of an amended complaint where the section 425.16 motion to strike
was filed within 60 days from the filing of challenged amended counterclaims.
76. See CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 425.16(f).
77. Church of Scientology v. Wollershein, 42 Cal. App. 4th 628, 656, 49 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 620, 637 (Ct App. 1996); see also DuPont Merck Pharm. Co. v. Supe-
rior Court, 78 Cal. App. 4th 562, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 755 (Ct. App. 2000) (ruling
that surviving a demurer was insufficient to substantiate that a claim was legally
sufficient under the standard of section 425.16).
78. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(2).
79. See Wilcox v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. App. 4th 809, 823, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d
446, 454 (Ct. App. 1994); see also Church of Scientology, 42 Cal. App. 4th at
654, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 635; Dixon v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. App 4th 733, 746,
36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 687, 696 (Ct. App. 1994).
80. See Dixon, 30 Cal. App. 4th at 745-46, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 696-97.
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reviews that decision as a question of law.81 Should the trial court
deny the motion, the SLAPPee also has an immediate right of ap-
peal.8
2
B. The SLAPPee's Burden of Proof83
Section 425.16's procedures are aimed at providing protection
against lawsuits "brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the
constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress
of grievances ... in matters of public significance., 84 The statute
permits a special motion to strike to be brought whenever the lawsuit
involves "[a] cause of action against a person arising from any act of
that person in furtherance of the person's right of petition or free
speech ... in connection with a public issue. ' 85 Where a SLAPPee
files such a motion, the statute provides that it shall be granted unless
the SLAPPer establishes a probability of prevailing on the claim.
86
Thus, the statute provides some definition of the SLAPPer's
burden of proof. The statute also makes clear that the SLAPPer's
burden should not arise unless the lawsuit is within the statute's
81. See Matson v. Dvorak, 40 Cal. App. 4th 539, 548, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 880,
886 (Ct App. 1995); see also CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 425.160) (making an
order granting a special motion to strike expressly appealable under CAL. CIv.
PROC. CODE § 904.1).
82. See CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE § 425.160) (making an order denying a spe-
cial motion to strike immediately appealable under CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE §
904.1).
83. For a general discussion of the SLAPPee's burden of proof, see 5
WITKIN PROCEDURE, supra note 59, § 963(a)(3).
84. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(a).
85. Id. § 425.16(b)(1).
86. See id. Over the three-year period that the legislature considered enacting
anti-SLAPP legislation, serious debate surrounded the issue of the standard of
proof to be required of SLAPP plaintiffs. Alternatives proffered during the debate
included requiring proof of a "substantial probability," a "substantial possibility,"
or a "probability" of success. See Barker, supra note 11, at 411-12. Another al-
ternative was to search for "evidence to substantiate the claim." Id. The resulting
"probability" standard poses potential constitutional due process problems by re-
quiring of plaintiffs proof "by preponderance?' well before they get to trial. Id. at
412. The "probability" standard seems to represent a compromise with business
interests. See id.
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scope. There is no specification of who has the burden of establish-
ing that the action arises out of acts in furtherance of the
SLAPPee's First Amendment rights. However, the courts, beginning
with Wilcox v. Superior Court,87 have required the SLAPPee-movant
to demonstrate that the statute applies,88 given that it is the SLAPPee
who will benefit if it does.
What constitutes "[any] act in furtherance of a person's right of
petition or free speech ... in connection with a public issue" is fur-
ther defined in subsection (e), which notes that such an act includes:
(1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a
legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other
official proceeding authorized by law; (2) any written or
oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue
under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or
judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized
by law; (3) any written or oral statement or writing made in
a place open to the public or a public forum in connection
with an issue of public interest; (4) or any other conduct in
furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of pe-
tition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection
with a public issue or an issue of public interest.89
To demonstrate how the statute applies to the SLAPPee's motion, the
SLAPPee must make a prima facie showing that the SLAPPer's
claims arose from the SLAPPee's lawful act and that the act either
falls within one of section 425.16(e)'s definitions9" or is the type of
act which should be considered protected under the statute.9' The
87. 27 Cal. App. 4th 809,33 Cal. Rptr. 2d446 (Ct App. 1994).
88. See id. at 819, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 452 ("[I]t is fundamentally fair that be-
fore putting the plaintiff[-SLAPPer] to the burden of establishing probability of
success on the merits the defendant[-SLAPPee] be required to show imposing that
burden is justified by the nature of the plaintiff's complaint."); see also Matson v.
Dvorak, 40 Cal. App. 4th 539, 547, 46 CaL Rptr. 2d 880, 885 (Ct App. 1995)
(noting that the "threshold requirement" is the movant's "show[ing that the]
claims arose from an act in furtherance of his right of free speech").
89. CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 425.16(e).
90. See, e.g., Wilcox, 27 Cal. App. 4th at 819,33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 452.
91. See Averill v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. App. 4th 1170, 1175, 50 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 62, 65 (Ct App. 1996) (observing that the categories in section
425.16(e) are not all-inclusive).
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remaining subsections of Part III will explore the SLAPPee's differ-
ing burden of proof depending on which type of protected act is
alleged. Appendix 2 provides a summary of circumstances where
the SLAPPee's burden was met or not met.
1. Acts "in connection with a public issue"
Since the language of section 425.16(b)(1) appears to limit its
protection to suits involving First Amendment activity "in connec-
tion with a public issue, '92 there were early fears that courts would
interpret the "public issue" language narrowly.93 These initial fears
were based on the concern that any display of self-interest by a
SLAPPee would be used to defeat section 425.16 motions, since al-
most everyone would have some self-interest in any activist activ-
ity.94  It was thus hoped that the public interest factor would be
broadly construed.
92. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1). The legislative intent stated in
section 425.16(a) also refers to "[e]ncourag[ing] continued participation in
matters of public significance." Id. (emphasis added). In discussing how to
harmonize this language in the preamble with that of "public interest" in sub-
sections 425.16(b) and (e), one court provided the following analysis prior to
the 1997 addition of clause (4) to subsection (e):
[T]he meaning ascribed to the concept of "public significance" in the
preamble must accommodate the singular, clearly def'med[,] protected
activities set forth in each clause of section 425.16 subdivision (e). To
harmonize the two provisions, the term "significance" should be read
as simply the meaning or import of a particular matter. Thus a matter
has public meaning or significance within the language of section
425.16, subdivision (a) because and solely because (1) it occurs within
the context of the proceedings delineated in clause one [of subdivision
(e)] (i.e. "any statement or writing made before .... "); or (2) it occurs
in connection with an issue under consideration or review by one of
the bodies or proceedings delineated in clause two; or (3) it is an issue
of public interest that is aired to the public or in a public forum.
Braun v. Chronicle Publ'g Co., 52 Cal. App. 4th 1036, 1048, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d
58, 64-65 (Ct App. 1997); see also Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope and Op-
portunity, 19 Cal. 4th 1106, 1118-19, 969 P.2d 564, 571-72, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d
471, 478 (1999) (quoting with approval Braun's analysis).
93. See Barker, supra note 11, at400-01.
94. See id. at 401.
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Initially, the fears appeared to be groundless. One of the early
cases to interpret section 425.16, Ludwig v. Superior Court,95
showed that self-interest would not necessarily defeat a section
425.16 claim. In that case, Ludwig, a real estate developer, wanted
to build an outlet mall near Barstow, California.96 The City of
Barstow sued Ludwig for interference with contractual relations, in-
terference with prospective economic advantage, and unfair compe-
tition after Ludwig had sent a number of his employees to various
public hearings to protest the development of a similar mall proposed
by the City on environmental grounds.97 Notwithstanding Ludwig's
obvious self-interest, the court upheld his right to use section
425.16.98 Additionally, other courts have shown a willingness to ap-
ply section 425.16 to situations where the communications underly-
ing the SLAPPer's claims were between private parties, including
those in which the issue of public concern was not obvious.99
In 1996, however, three cases took a narrower approach, con-
cluding that the statute applied only if the "in connection with a
public interest" factor was separately met.' 0 Each of these cases
95. 37 Cal. App. 4th 8, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 350 (Ct. App. 1995).
96. See id. at 12,34 Cal. Rptr. 2dat353.
97. See id., 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 353-54.
98. See id. at 16,34 Cal. Rptr. 2dat356. Another example of a self-interested
SLAPPee can be found in Church ofScientology v. Wollersheim, 42 Cal. App. 4th
628, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 620 (Ct. App. 1996) (ruling on behalf of plaintiff a former
member who sued the church and finally won the judgment after a 15-year litiga-
tion battle, and finding that plaintiffs motion to strike the church's action to set
thejudgment aside on the basis of the judge's bias fell within section 425.16).
99. See, e.g., Averill, 42 Cal. App. 4th 1170, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 62 (finding that
SLAPPee's private communications arose in the context of a public issue and
were within the statute, either expressly because the matter was still under review
by the city, or implicitly because the statutory definitions were not exclusive);
Wilcox, 27 Cal. App. 4th 809, 33 Cal. Rplr. 2d 446 (finding that SLAPPee's dis-
semination of a memo to fellow court reporters regarding a private group's con-
tractual practices and urging support for litigation challenging those practices fell
within the statute).
100. See Linsco/Private Ledger, Inc. v. Investors Arbitration Servs., Inc., 50
Cal. App. 4th 1633, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 613 (Ct App. 1996) (reversing motion to
strike against securities broker-dealers who had sued a company that provided as-
sistance and representation to individual investors who pursued arbitration claims
against the broker-dealers contending the company was engaged in unauthorized
practice of law, and holding that private arbitration matters did not involve public
issues); Ericsson GE Mobile Communications, Inc. v. C.S.I. Telecomms.
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reversed a trial court's granting of a section 425.16 motion to strike.
The SLAPPee's acts underlying each of the lawsuits were of the type
that section 425.16(e)(2) described: "written or oral statement[s] ...
made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a
legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official pro-
ceeding authorized by law."'10' Although these courts recognized
that the second clause contained no reference to "public issue" or an
analogous phrase, they nevertheless concluded that section
425.16(e)(2) terminology did not eliminate the "in connection with a
public issue" requirement. "The operative language in subdivision
(b), partially exemplified by [clause (2)], continues to require that
the issue in question, i.e. 'an issue under consideration or review
by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official
Eng'rs, 49 Cal. App. 4th 1591, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 491 (Ct App. 1996) (reversing
motion to strike against comrmmications company that had lost bid to supply and
install systems for county and that had sued the consultant who recommended that
the county accept another company's proposal for intentional interference with
economic advantage; consultant's report to county client was not speech in con-
nection with public issue); Zhao v. Wong, 48 Cal App. 4th 1114, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d
909 (Ct App. 1996) (reversing motion to strike against a decedent's girlfiend-
business partner who sued decedent's brother for slander based on statements he
had made to a reporter implicating plaintiff in decedent's death and forging of his
will, even though the brother alleged that his statements were efforts to influence
both the coroner's investigation and a will contest; no public issue found). Each
of these cases was disapproved by Briggs, 19 Cal. 4th 1106, 969 P.2d 564, 81
Cal Rptr. 2d 471, in its reversal of a 1997 court of appeal decision that had es-
poused a similar perspective as the three 1996 cases. See id. at 1113-17, 969 P.2d
at 568-71, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 475-77 (reversing motion to strike against landlord
who sued for defunation and other claims against a nonprofit organization that
provided counseling, mediation, and referral services concerning landlord-tenant
disputes; organization's activities were of private, not public, significance), rev'g,
54 Cal. App. 4th 1237,63 Cal. Rptr. 434 (Ct. App. 1997).
Briggs also disapproved of Mission Oaks Ranch, Ltd. v. County of Santa
Barbara, 65 Cal. App. 4th 713, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1 (Ct App. 1998), apparently be-
cause it accepted the conclusion of Ericsson that section 425.16 does not en-
compass disputes between private parties, even when the dispute involves a
decision-making process by a governmental agency. See Briggs, 19 Cal. 4th at
1106, 969 P.2d at 564, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 471. Mission Oaks Ranch did up-
hold the dismissal of a SLAPPer's claim, but only by distinguishing its facts
from those of Ericsson. See 65 Cal. App. 4th at 728-29, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 10-
11.
101. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(e)(2).
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proceeding authorized by law,' be a public issue."'10 2 These opinions
concluded that a SLAPPee must show not only that the SLAPPee's
act was a statement defined under clause (1)103 or in connection with
an issue under consideration by an authorized official proceeding, as
defined by clause (2), but also that the statement concerned a public
issue.
These courts also viewed the statute's coverage as applicable
only "to a limited sphere of activities," based on the language of the
then-legislative purpose of section 425.16(a).' 0 4  The statute was
therefore characterized "as providing an extraordinary remedy for a
narrowly defined category of litigation."' 1 5 In particular, the statute
was not seen as applying "broadly" to defamation actions. 10 6 Within
this narrowed frame of reference, only those activities "closely tied
to the right to petition and the freedom of speech" were acts pro-
tected by the statute.'0 7 This restricted view of which activities Sec-
tion 425.16 covered became merged with the requirement that a
SLAPPee show the existence of a public issue when one court con-
strued the term "public interest" "as referring [only] to matters occu-
pying 'the highest rung of the heirachy [sic] of First Amendment
values,' that is, to speech pertaining to the exercise of democratic
self-government."' 0 8
Although other courts declined to take up this mantle of more
narrowly interpreting section 425.16's coverage, 0 9 not surprisingly
those courts that did began reversing trial courts which had granted
102. Zhao, 48 Cal. App. 4th at 1127, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 917; accord Lin-
sco/Private Ledger, Inc., 50 Cal. App. 4th at 1639, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 616-17;
Ericsson, 49 Cal. App. 4th at 1601-02, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 496-97.
103. It should be noted that section 425.16(e)'s clause (1), CAL. Civ. PROC.
CODE § 425.16(e)(1), like its clause (2), id. § 425.16(e)(2), contains no refer-
ence to "public issue" or an equivalent phrase.
104. Zhao, 48 Cal. App. 4th at 1129, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 918; accord Lin-
sco/Private Ledger, Inc., 50 Cal. App. 4th at 1638, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 616; Er-
icsson, 49 Cal. App. 4th at 1601, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 497-98.
105. Zhao, 48 Cal. App. 4th at 1133, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 921.
106. See id. at 1130, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2dat 919.
107. Linsco/Private Ledger, Inc., 50 Cal. App. 4th at 1638, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
616; accord Zhao, 48 Cal. App. 4th at 1129, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 918.
108. Zhao, 48 Cal. App. 4th at 1122, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 913.
109. See, e.g., Braun, 52 Cal. App. 4th 1036, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 58.
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SLAPPees' motions to strike." °  The California legislature was
quick to react to that trend, however, and in 1997, it unanimously
amended section 425.16's legislative purpose statement to emphasize
that the "section shall be construed broadly.""' Then, in 1999, the
California Supreme Court in Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope and
Opportunity"2 definitively put to rest the idea that there was any
proof requirement for the SLAPPee as to "public issue" where the
act underlying the lawsuit was an activity falling under section
425.16(e), clause (1) or (2).
113
The Briggs court made its point in several ways. It contrasted
the difference between the language in clauses (1) and (2) and in
clauses (3) and (4).114 It thus observed that in the later definitions of
communications made in a public forum and "other conduct" in-
volving speech or petition rights, there is explicit language requiring
that the acts be in connection with a public issue or an issue of public
interest.1 15 In the earlier clauses, which describe communications
110. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text. In their consideration of
the 1997 amendments, both legislative houses noted the conflicting opinions in
the courts of appeal as to whether the legislature had intended the statute to be
construed narrowly, citing Zhao, or broadly, citing, for example, Church of
Scientologv. See ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY,
COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1296, at 4 (July 2, 1997); SENATE JUDICIARY
COMMITrEE, CALIFORNIA SENATE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1296, at 4
(May 13, 1997). The 1997 amendment clarified the legislature's intent that the
broad interpretation was the proper one.
112. 19 Cal. 4th 1106, 969 P.2d 564,81 Cal. Rptr. 2d471 (1999) (disapproving
Zhao, Ericeson, Linsco/Private Ledger, Inc., and Mission Oaks Ranch, Ltd.); see
5 WITKIN PROCEDURE, supra note 59, § 962A (discussing the Briggs decision).
113. There was a strong dissent in Briggs which, while agreeing with the re-
versal of the decision below as to the particular defendant's activities, ex-
pressed a concern that the majority's broad conclusion "will authorize use of
the extraordinary anti-SLAPP remedy in a great number of cases to which it
was never intended to apply." 19 Cal. 4th at 1124, 969 P.2d at 576, 81 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 482 (Baxter, J., concurring and dissenting); see also Matthew Hel-
ler, Who's SLAPPing Whom?, 17 CAL. LAw. 17 (Nov. 1997) ("'You can bet
every [defense] attorney is going to try to shoehorn their case into a motion to
strike,' says Michael G. Reedy, one of the successful plaintiffs lawyers in the
Zhao appeal.").
114. See Briggs, 19 Cal. 4th at 1117, 969 P.2d at 571, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
477.
115. See CAL. CrV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(e)(3) ("any written or oral state-
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made before or in connection with matters under review by official
proceedings, there is no similar delimiting public issue language.116.
As a result of this difference, the California Supreme Court con-
cluded that, for clauses (1) and (2),
"Under the plain terms of the statute it is the context or set-
ting itself that makes the issue a public issue: all that mat-
ters is that the First Amendment activity take place in an of-
ficial proceeding or be made in connection with an issue
being reviewed by an official proceeding.""1
7
The Briggs court believed that the legislature, in drafting these
two definitions, had "equated a public issue with the authorized offi-
cial proceeding to which it connects."' 18  Consequently, the court
also concluded that the definitions of clauses (1) and (2) were not
limited only to certain types of petitioning activity. In particular, the
courts of appeal were incorrect in deciding "that the only activities
qualifying for statutory protection are those which meet the lofty
standard of pertaining to the heart of self-government."119 The
Briggs court found that the legislature had intended subsections
(e)(1) and (2) to be interpreted in a manner that "broadly encom-
passes participation in official proceedings, generally, whether or not
such participation remains strictly focused on 'public' issues.' 0
ment or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in con-
nection with an issue of public interest"); id. § 425.16(e)(4) ("any other con-
duct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the
constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue
of public interest").
116. See id. § 425.16(e)(1) ("any written or oral statement or writing made be-
fore a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceed-
ing authorized by law"); id. § 425.16(e)(2) ("any written or oral statement or
writing ade in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a leg-
islative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by
law").
117. Briggs, 19 Cal. 4th at 1116, 969 P.2d at 570, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 477
(quoting Braun, 52 Cal. App. 4th at 1047, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 64).
118. Id. at 1117, 969 P.2d at 570, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 477 (quoting Braun, 52
Cal. App. 4th at 1047, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 64) (enphasis omitted).
119. Id. at 1116, 969 P.2d at 570, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 477 (quoting Braun, 52
Cal. App. 4th at 1046-47, 61 Cal. Rplr. 2d at 63).
120. Id. at 1118, 969 P.2d at 571, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 478. The Briggs court
invited the legislature to respond, if the court's conclusions were inappropriate.
See id. at 1123, 969 P.2d at 575, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 481 ("If we today mistake
the Legislature's intention, the Legislature may easily amend the statute.").
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The court's decision was reinforced by the fact that narrow judicial
decisions of the type Briggs reversed or disapproved had prompted
the legislature's 1997 amendment mandating broad construction of
the statute.' 2'
In contrast to the bright-line test of the "official proceeding"
context in clauses (1) and (2) of section 425.16, the Briggs court
noted that there was no clear demarcation in clauses (3) and (4), cov-
ering respectively "a place open to the public or a public forum" and
"other conduct.' '122 In those clauses, the legislature included an "is-
sue of public interest limitation.' 2 3 The court, however, did not
provide any further discussion of clauses (3) and (4).
The cases decided to date have found that a range of activities
meets the public interest or public issue factor: a union election af-
fecting 10,000 members,' 24 a townhouse owner's protest against a
management assessment,' 25 development of a discount mall with its
potential effects of increased traffic and environmental impacts,
2 6
placement of a shelter in a residential neighborhood, 127 statements
made during a political campaign, 128 inquiry as to "whether money
designated for charities was being received by those charities,"' 29
and the practice of "direct contracting" by certified shorthand report-
ers, which involved an exclusive contract between reporters and a
major consumer of reporting services.' 30  All these cases have
121. See id. at 1120, 969 P.2d at 573, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 479-80; see also
supra note 111 and accompanying text.
122. 19 Cal. 4that 1123, 969 P.2d at 575, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 481.
123. Id.; see CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(e)(3) ("in connection with an
issue of public interest'); id. § 425.16(e)(4) ("in connection with a public issue or
an issue of public interest").
124. See Macias v. Hartwell, 55 Cal. App. 4th 669, 673-74, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d
222, 225 (Ct App. 1997).
125. See Foothills Townhome Ass'n v. Christiansen, 65 Cal. App. 4th 688,
695-96, 76 Cal. Rplr. 2d 516, 520 (Ct. App. 1998).
126. See Ludwig, 37 Cal. App. 4th at 15, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 355.
127. See Averill, 42 Cal. App. 4th at 1175, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 65.
128. See Conroy v. Spitzer, 70 Cal. App. 4th 1446, 1448, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d
443, 445 (Ct App. 1999); Matson v. Dvorak, 40 Cal. App. 4th 539, 548, 46
Cal. Rptr. 2d 880, 885-86 (Ct App. 1995).
129. Dove Audio, Inc. v. Rosenfeld, Mayer & Susman, 47 Cal. App. 4th 777,
784, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 830, 834 (Ct App. 1996).
130. See Wilcox, 27 Cal. App. 4th at 821, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 453.
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approached the public interest/issue factor in the spirit of the statute's
mandate of broad construction.13 ' One of the early decisions de-
scribed the mandate in this manner: "Although matters of public in-
terest include legislative and governmental activities, they may also
include activities that involve private persons and entities, especially
when a large, powerful organization may impact the lives of many
individuals. Examples are product liability suits, real estate or in-
vestment scams, etc.'
32
Two of the most recent cases involving the public interest issue
provide good examples of this expansive judicial view concerning
the public interest/issue factor. In the first, a nationally known po-
litical consultant sued a magazine publisher for libel and other claims
after the magazine published an article focusing on a custody dispute
between the plaintiff and his first wife.133 The article reported that
both the first and second wives had testified at the custody hearing
that plaintiff had physically and verbally abused them. 134 In opposi-
tion to the publisher's motion to strike, the plaintiff argued that his
treatment of his former wives was not a public issue and thus the ar-
ticle was not within the scope of section 425.16.135 The court, how-
ever, disagreed, noting first that generally "[d]omestic violence is an
extremely important public issue in our society,"'136 and then con-
cluding specifically that "the details of appellant's career and appel-
lant's ability to capitalize on domestic violence issues in his adver-
tising campaigns for politicians known around the world, while
allegedly committing violence against his former wives, are public
issues" within the protection of section 425.16.
131. See CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE § 425.16(a).
132. Church of Scientology, 42 Cal. App. 4th at 650, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 633.
133. See Sipple v. Foundation for Nat'l Progress, 71 Cal. App. 4th 226, 83
Cal. Rptr. 2d 677 (Ct App. 1999).
134. See id. at 230, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 679.
135. See id. at 236, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 682.
136. Id. at 238, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 684; see also DuPont Merck Pharm. Co.
v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. App. 4th 562, 567, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 755, 759 (Ct.
App. 2000) (finding that the issue of the equivalency of a medication with its
generic counterpart was one of public interest because of"[b]oth the number of
persons allegedly affected and the seriousness of the conditions treated").
137. Sipple, 71 Cal. App. 4th at 239-40, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 685.
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The second case concerned a television program that covered
law enforcement activities in connection with a drug overdose death,
including a telephone call to the parents of the victim. 138 The parent-
plaintiffs sued for invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, and other claims. 139 The defendants' motion to strike
urged in part that their television program "'concerned the conse-
quences of drug abuse and the duties of law enforcement, both of
which are "issues of public interest"' which [fell] within subdivision
(e)(4).,' 140 The trial court agreed and granted the motion.141 The ap-
pellate court also found that the defendants' acts were within the
statute, equating "issues of public interest" with newsworthiness.'
42
However, the appellate court reversed the trial court's granting of the
motion upon a finding that the plaintiffs had met their burden of
showing a probability of prevailing on one claim, but had failed to
meet the burden for certain other claims. 143
2. Statements in a public place or forum (section 425.16(e)(3))
A SLAPPee may also seek protection for an act covered by
section 425.16(e)(3): a "written or oral statement ... [on a matter
of public interest] made in a place open to the public or a public
forum." ' 44 With respect to the meaning of "public forum" in clause
(3), Zhao is the only California appellate case that has examined
the term in any detail' 45 Drawing upon definitions already provided
138. See Marich v. QRZ Media, Inc., 73 Cal. App. 4th 299, 316, 86 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 406, 418-19 (Ct. App. 1999).
139. See id. at 307, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 412.
140. Id.
141. See id. at 309-10, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 413-14.
142. See id. at 316, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 418-19.
143. See id. at 316-19, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 419-21.
144. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(e)(3).
145. See Zhao, 48 Cal. App. 4th at 1125-27, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 916-17. The
Zhao court discussed the term in 1996, before section 425.16(e) included
clause (4), which was added as part of the 1997 amendment. See supra note 38
and accompanying text.
Two federal district court cases have considered the nature of "public fo-
rum." In Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Computer Group, Inc., 63 F.
Supp. 2d 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1999), the plaintiff moved to strike certain counter-
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for the term in an earlier California case and by an author, Zhao de-
clared:
"The term 'public forum' ... refers typically to those places
historically associated with First Amendment activities,
such as streets, sidewalks, and parks." In the words of a
seminal law review article, "in an open democratic society
the streets, the parks, and other public places are an impor-
tant facility for public discussion and political process.
They are in brief a public forum that the citizen can com-
mandeer; the generosity and empathy with which such fa-
cilities are made available is an index of freedoni"'
146
The Zhao court also noted that another California court had de-
scribed the concept of a public forum as "'a continuum, with public
streets and parks at one end and government institutions like hospi-
tals and prisons at the other.""147 Within the continuum are libraries
and schools, "where free expression may be regulated to the extent
that it is 'incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place
at a particular time.""148 But the Zhao court specifically concluded
claims pursuant to section 425.16. See id. The claims were based upon state-
ments the plaintiff had made "to the markef' about its competitor-defendants.
See id. at 1130. The court observed that since the statements "were not made
during or in connection with an official proceeding... the statements come
within the protection of the anti-SLAPP statute only if they can be character-
ized as statements made in a place open to the public or a public forum in con-
nection with an issue of public interest." Id. The court refused to find section
425.16 applicable because it was unable to find any California case concluding
that "the 'issue of public interest' test is met by statements of one company re-
garding the conduct of a competitor company." Id. The court also expressed
its disbelief that the California legislature intended the statute to apply to
commercial competition claims such as trade libel and false advertising. See
id. By contrast, in Metabolife Int'l, Inc. v. Wornick, 72 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (S.D.
Cal. 1999), the court had no difficulty finding a widely disseminated television
program to be a public forum where the plaintiff's claims were all based on
statements made in that broadcast and where the plaintiff conceded that the
program's topic was a matter of public concern. See id. at 1165.
146. Zhao, 48 Cal. App. 4th at 1126, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 916 (citations omit-
ted) (quoting Prisoners Union v. Department of Corrections, 135 Cal. App. 3d
930, 934-35, 185 Cal. Rptr. 634, 636 (Ct App. 1982)) (citing Adderley v.
Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 48 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting)).
147. Id. (quoting U.C. Nuclear Weapons Labs. Conversion Project v. Law-
rence Livermore Lab., 154 Cal. App. 3d 1157, 1164, 201 Cal. Rptr. 837, 843
(Ct App. 1984)).
148. Id. (quoting United States v. Douglass, 579 F.2d 545, 548-49 (9th Cir.
Ar~pril 2000)
LOYOLA OFLOS ANGELES LA WREVIE W [Vol. 33:801
that "private newspaper publishing falls outside of this concept of a
public forum."' 49
In Zhao, the defendant was sued for statements made to a re-
porter which the plaintiff alleged were slanderous. 50  Given the
court's perspective on the scope of a public forum, it concluded that
clause (3) of section 425.16 was inapplicable because the defendant
had not made statements "'in a place open to the public or a public
forum' but rather.., in a private setting to a reporter."'
151
While Zhao was. later disapproved, that disapproval was not
based on its interpretation and conclusions concerning clause (3) of
section 425.16(e), but only for its erroneous requirement of a public
interest under clauses (1) and (2).152 Thus, its views on clause (3) are
yet to be tested. Only two other courts have found the existence of a
public forum for purposes of clause (3), but both courts were conclu-
sory in their findings and provided little analysis.1
53
1978)).
149. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the Zhao court relied on dictum from
Lafayette Morehouse. See id. The Lafayette Morehouse court had declined to
consider whether a newspaper article that was the basis of a claim of libel fit
clause (3) of subsection 425.16(e). See Lafayette Morehouse, 37 Cal. App. 4th
at 863 n.5, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at51 n.5. However, the Lafayette Morehouse court
did note:
No authorities have been cited to us holding a newspaper printing al-
legedy libelous material is a "place open to the public or a public fo-
rum." Newspaper editors or publishers customarily retain the final
authority on what their newspapers will publish in letters to the editor,
editorial pages, and even news articles, resulting at best in a controlled
forum not an uninhibited "public forum."
Id. (finding protection for a newspaper publisher from a libel suit under sub-
section 425.16(e)(2)).
150. See Zhao, 48 Cal. App. 4th at 1119, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 911.
151. Id. at 1131, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 919.
152. See supra notes 100-21 and accompanying text.
153. See Foothills Townhome Ass', 65 Cal. App. 4th at 695-96, 76 Cal. Rplr.
2d at 520 (finding that although homeowner's continuing dispute with a town-
home association over a special assessment was a matter of sufficient public in-
terest made in a sufficiently public forum to invoke the protection of section
425.16, defendant did not demonstrate that the lawsuit was brought against him to
chill his First Amendment rights); Macias, 55 Cal. App. 4th at 673-74, 64 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 225 (finding speech by mail to be a public forum and union election to
be of public interest).
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Concerning the possible scope of the term "public forum" in
section 425.16, however, it should be noted that the protection of free
speech under the California Constitution is broader than under the
U.S. Constitution.' 54  The California courts have rejected a rigid
formulation of the concept of public forum in cases involving con-
stitutional protection. 155 Courts have found the existence of a public
forum in places such as a privately owned railway station, 156 a pri-
vate sidewalk leading to a large supermarket,157 the parking lot of a
prison, 158 and in a prison newspaper. 159 After analyzing a number of
these California cases, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal stated:
[F]or the purposes of the California Liberty of Speech
Clause, the "public forum" doctrine is not limited to tradi-
tional public forums such as streets, sidewalks, and parks or
to sites dedicated to communicative activity such as mu-
nicipal theaters. Rather the test under California law is
whether the communicative activity "is basically incom-
patible with the normal activity of a particular place at a
particular time."16
0
154. See Griset v. Fair Political Practices Comm'n, 8 Cal. 4th 851, 866 n.5,
884 P.2d 116, 126 n.5, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 659, 669 n.5 (1994) ("As a general
matter, the liberty of speech clause in the California Constitution is more pro-
tective of speech than its federal counterpart."); Wilson v. Superior Court, 13
Cal. 3d 652, 658, 532 P.2d 116, 120, 119 Cal. Rptr. 468, 472 (1975) (Califor-
nia's constitutional protection of speech is "more definitive and inclusive than
the First Amendment').
155. See, e.g., In re Hoffman, 67 Cal. 2d 845, 850, 434 P.2d 353, 356, 64
Cal. Rptr. 97, 100 (1967) (First Amendment activities cannot be prohibited
solely because the property involved is not maintained primarily as a forum for
such activities); U.C. Nuclear Weapons, 154 Cal. App. 3d at 1164, 201 Cal.
Rptr. at 843 ("public forum!' concept is a continuum).
156. See In re Hoffman, 67 Cal. 2d at 847, 434 P.2d at 354, 64 Cal. Rptr. at
98.
157. See In re Lane, 71 Cal. 2d 872, 873, 457 P.2d 561, 562, 79 Cal. Rptr.
729, 730 (1969); see also Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d
899, 910 n.5, 592 P.2d 341, 347 n.5, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854, 860 n.5 (1979) (find-
ing that in modem society, large private shopping malls are becoming 'minia-
ture downtowns' where large groups of citizens congregate).
158. See Prisoners Union v. Department of Corrections, 135 Cal. App. 3d
930, 185 Cal. Rptr. 634 (Ct App. 1982).
159. See Bailey v. Loggins, 32 Cal. 3d 907, 654 P.2d 758, 187 Cal. Rptr. 575
(1982).
160. Carreras v. City of Anaheim, 768 F.2d 1039, 1045 (9th Cir. 1985)
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Given these precedents, the fact that a central purpose of section
425.16 is to protect free speech, and in light of the legislative direc-
tive to construe the statute broadly, it would not be unexpected for
the California Supreme Court to define public forum more broadly in
the context of clause (3) than did the Zhao court.
3. Protection for conduct (section 425.16(e)(4))
The original statute expressly provided for protection only of
certain written or oral statements.161 However, in an early interpre-
tation of section 425.16, one court observed that "an 'act in further-
ance of a person's First Amendment rights is not limited to oral and
written statements" but can also include constitutionally protected
conduct, such as a peaceful boycott.162 Section 425.16(e)'s use of
the word "includes" was also found to make the enumeration of
types of protected acts non-exclusive; thus, other categories of acts
could be within the statute's coverage as well. 163  In the 1997
amendment to section 425.16, the legislature made explicit that
"other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional
right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connec-
tion with a public issue or an issue of public interest" was also a
protected activity. 1
64
Only one appellate decision prior to the 1997 amendment con-
sidered the application of the statute to a SLAPPee's actual con-
duct. 65  In Linsco/Private Ledger, Inc. v. Investors Arbitration
Services, Inc.,166 securities broker-dealers brought two separate law-suits against Investors Arbitration Services, Inc. (IAS), a company
(quoting Prisoners Union, 135 Cal. App. 3d at 939, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 639).
161. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
162. Wilcox, 27 Cal. App. 4th at 820-21, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 452-53 (also noting
that burning down a SLAPPer-developer's office as a political protest would not
be protected conduct).
163. See Averill, 42 Cal. App. 4th at 1175, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 65.
164. CAL. Cir. PROC. CODE § 425.16(e)(4) (West 1997).
165. The facts of the cases decided by the two courts that took a broad view of
section 425.16(e)'s coverage did not involve conduct. See supra notes 162-63
and accompanying text.
166. 50 Cal. App. 4th 1633, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 613 (Ct. App. 1996), disap-
proved by Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope and Opportunity, 19 Cal. 4th 1106,
969 P.2d 564, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 471 (1999).
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that provided investors with assistance and representation in pursuing
an arbitration claim against a securities broker.167 The broker-dealer
plaintiffs sought injunctions against IAS alleging they were unlaw-
fully practicing law, as well as other claims, including civil conspir-
acy.168 AS moved to strike under section 425.16 in both suits, and
the trial court granted both motions. On appeal, the matters were
consolidated, and the appellate court reversed the trial court on the
basis that the lawsuits did not qualify as SLAPP suits.
169
In reaching its conclusion, the court applied the narrow perspec-
tive of Zhao and found that the defendant had failed to meet its bur-
den of proof on two levels. 170 First, although apparently acknowl-
edging that arbitration proceedings qualify as "judicial proceedings"
under section 425.16(e), the court did not find that the plaintiffs'
claims fell within either clause (1) or (2). The plaintiffs' claims did
not restrict the petition rights of the investors because they still had
access to the arbitration forum171 Moreover, the lawsuits did not
implicate IAS's freedom of speech because the plaintiffs' challenge
was to "IAS's conduct, its activities in a representative capacity on
167. See Linsco/Private Ledger, Inc., 50 Cal. App. 4th at 1635, 58 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 614. As a practice, the securities industry includes binding arbitration
clauses in contracts between investors and brokers. The courts have enforced
such arbitration contracts. See, e.g., Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton,
Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995). The National Association of Securities Dealers
(NASD) drafted both a Code of Arbitration Procedure and an Arbitrators'
Manual, with the approval of the Securities Exchange Commission. Both
guidelines permit an investor to be represented by a non-attorney for arbitra-
tion proceedings. See Linsco/Private Ledger, Inc., 50 Cal. App. 4th at 1636 &
n.4, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 614-15 & n.4. No doubt unhappy with the develop-
ment of firms such as the instant defendant, which had developed expertise in
assisting investors, the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration has con-
cluded that the activities of non-attorney representatives constitute the practice
of law and may therefore be illegal under state law. The Conference has thus
recommended that the NASD adopt a rule prohibiting representation that
would violate state law. However, the NASD has taken no action on that rec-
ommendation. See id. at 1636, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 615. The resultant lawsuits
were apparently attempts to achieve the same result as the proposed rule
against the defendant, one of the largest of the arbitration advisor firms.
168. See id. at 1637 & n.5, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 615 & n.5.
169. See id. at 1637, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 615.
170. See id. at 1638, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 616.
171. See id.
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behalf of its investor-clients.' 72 Second, the court found the absence
of a public issue because "disputes over individual investment losses
are matters of private, not public, concern." 
73
Given the legislature's express inclusion of "other conduct" in
the 1997 amendment, the court's dismissal on the basis of the plain-
tiffs' claims being beyond the scope of section 425.16(e) is no longer
tenable. However, the court's conclusion about the lack of 'public
interest" would have to be reexamined given the requirement of a
"public issue/interest" factor in section 425.16(e)(4). Such a reex-
amination would need to consider the legislature's other amendment
mandating a broad construction of the statute, as well as the overall
tone of Briggs, which also directed the statute's broad construe-
tion.' 74 Thus, it is likely that a current court would view IAS's con-
duct as being within section 425.16(e)(4)'s protections. First, the
court could find that aiding investors to maneuver through the arbi-
tration would be "conduct in furtherance of the [investors'] exercise
of the constitutional right of petition."'175 Second, the court would be
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1639, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 617.
174. See generally Briggs, 19 Cal. 4th 1106, 969 P.2d 564, 81 Cal. Rptr.
471.
175. CAL. Cry. PROC. CODE § 425.16(e)(4) (West Supp. 2000). In this re-
gard, the facts of Briggs can be instructive. There, the defendant was a non-
profit corporation that advised tenants and mediated landlord-tenant disputes.
See Briggs, 19 Cal. 4th at 1109, 969 P.2d at 566, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 472. The
landlord-plaintiffs based their claims on defendant's statements and, arguably,
on its conduct; including "assisting of tenant Ford 'to institute legal action with
HUD ... against the plaintiffs."' Id. at 1114, 969 P.2d at 569, 81 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 476 (omissions in original). The plaintiffs argued that "tenant
counseling activities like [the defendant's] are not protected by section 425.16
because they neither promoted [the defendant's] own constitutional right of
free speech nor informed the public about possible wrongdoing." Id. at 1116,
969 P.2d at 570, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 477. The Briggs court replied:
Even assuming, for purposes of argument that plaintiffs accurately
have characterized [the defendant's] activities as constituting neither
self-interested nor general political speech, we cannot conclude such
activities thereby necessarily fall outside the protection of the anti-
SLAPP statute. Contrary to plaintiffs' implied suggestion, the statute
does not require that a defendant moving to strike under section
425.16 demonstrate that its protected statements or writings were
made on its own behalf (rather than, for example, on behalf of its cli-
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more inclined to find the existence of the public issue/interest factor,
given the imbalance of power between individual investors operating
without the aid of a firm such as IAS, and the broker-dealer corpora-
tions which are aided by their organized associations. 1
76
Not long after the legislature's amendment of section 425.16,
but before the Briggs decision, another appellate court decided a case
involving conduct. 177 The facts of this case involved two developers
ents or the general public).
Id. (emphasis omitted).
176. See Church of Scientology, 42 Cal. App. 4th at 650, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
633 ("Although matters of public interest include legislative and governmental
activities, they may also include activities that involve private persons and en-
tities, especially when a large, powerful organization may impact the lives of
many individuals. Examples are product liability suits, real estate or invest-
ment scams, etc.").
Briggs can also be instructive on the scope of public interest. Citing
Zhao's reasoning, the Briggs plaintiffs argued that "section 425.16 does not
apply to events that transpire between private individuals" because the statute
applied only to a limited category of First Amendment activities. Briggs, 19
Cal. App. 4th at 1116, 969 P.2d at 570, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 476; see also supra
notes 100-21 and accompanying text (discussing Zhao's faulty reasoning).
The Linsco/Private Ledger, Inc. court used a similar analysis to conclude that
there was no "public issue" present in disputes between individual investors
and their brokers. See Linsco/Private Ledger, Inc., 50 Cal. App. 4th at 1639,
58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 617. The Briggs court, however, stated: "Zhao is incorrect
in its assertion that the only activities qualifying for statutory protection are
those which meet the lofty standard of pertaining to the heart of self-
government." 19 Cal. App. 4th at 1116, 969 P.2d at 570, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
477 (quoting Braun, 52 Cal. App. 4th at 1046-47, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 63).
177. See Los Cameros Community Assocs. v. Penfield & Smith Eng'rs, Inc.,
65 Cal. App. 4th 278, 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 396 (Ct. App. 1998), review granted and
action deferred pending disposition of Briggs, 966 P.2d 441, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d
407 (1998), review dismissed and cause remanded, 970 P.2d 409, 81 Cal. Rptr.
2d 835 (1999). Although the Los Carneros court ultimately concluded that
conduct was at issue, see 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 401, the court did not actually ap-
ply subsection 425.16(e)(4), the amended provision, in its analysis; rather, it
quoted only the original provision, section 425.16(e), clauses (l)-(3). See id. at
398-99.
A more recent case, Marich, 73 Cal. App. 4th 299, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 406,
concerning the making of a television show, allegedly involved section
425.16(e)(4) conduct. In moving to dismiss claims arising out of this program,
the defendants urged in part that it "'concerned the consequences of drug abuse
and the duties of law enforcement, both of which are "issues of public inter-
est"' which [fell] within subdivision (e)(4)." 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 412. The trial
court in Marich had granted the special motion to strike after finding that the
defendants had acted "in furtherance of their rights of free speech... in con-
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who individually desired to build commercial and residential com-
plexes on separate acreages near Goleta, California.' 78 The commu-
nity plan would not support both developments. The plaintiff-
company hired an expert to perform certain services and also to
lobby for the project before the appropriate government agencies. 1
79
The defendant-company hired the same expert for the same type of
services. 180 When confronted with the conflict, the expert decided to
continue with the plaintiff-company and end the relationship with the
defendant-company. 18 However, a few months later, the expert
again contacted the defendant-company seeking work. When the de-
fendant-company complained that an employee of the expert as-
signed to work with the plaintiff-company was criticizing its project
publicly, the expert sent a letter to the defendant-company indicating
that its employee would no longer participate in activities opposing
the defendant's project. 182 Viewing this letter as a secret contract,
the plaintiff-company sued both the expert and the defendant-
company for interference with prospective business advantage,
breach of contract, and equitable relief to prevent the continued rela-
tionship between the defendants. 83 Both defendants filed SLAPP
motions to strike the complaint. 84 Noting the expansive interpreta-
tion of the statute, the trial court granted the motions.' 8"
On appeal, the defendants focused on the letter-contract and ar-
gued that section 425.16 was applicable because it covers any written
or oral statement concerning a public issue "made in connection with
an issue under consideration or review" by a governmental body,
nection with issues of public interest" and that the plaintiffs had not established
a probability of prevailing on their claims. Id. at 413-14. The Marich appel-
late opinion agreed that the defendants' acts were within subsection
425.16(e)(4), equating "issues of public interest" with newsworthiness. See id.
at 418-19. Nevertheless, the appellate court reversed the trial court after pro-
viding an extensive analysis of why the plaintiffs had met their burden. See id.
at 414-21.
178. See Los Carneros, 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 397-98.
179. See id.
180. See id. at398.
181. See id.
182. See id.
183. See id. at 398.
184. See id. at 397.
185. See id.
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"even if the statement is made privately and concerns commercial
speech."186 After reviewing the various appellate decisions, the Los
Carneros court concluded:
The common thread among the cases is that the statements
or acts which formed the gravamen of the plaintiffs' com-
plaints were directly related to a matter of some public in-
terest, and the litigation was designed to stifle a citizen's
right to free speech or to extinguish the public's participa-
tion in the public process.
187
Recognizing that SLAPP suits often have claims relating to breach of
contract or other valid causes of action, the court noted that it must
examine the underlying goal of the lawsuit and grant a section
425.16 motion to strike only if the true objective is to interfere with
or burden a defendant's First Amendment rights.' 88 The court then
found that the Los Carneros defendants' conduct-the alleged
agreement that the expert would not oppose the defendant-
company's project as a promise for future work-was not intended to
advance free speech or petition rights. 189 The court also found that
the defendants' conduct did not implicate a public issue, notwith-
standing that the conduct (or promise not to act) would occur before
a governmental agency. 90 The court therefore concluded that the
defendants had not met their burden of showing that the conduct was
within section 425.16's protection. 19
186. Id. at 399 (citing Averill, 42 Cal. App. 4th at 1174-75, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 64-65). Defendants' argument would require that the letter-contract be
viewed as an example of the exercise of free speech or petition by a written
statement concerning the competitive projects (i.e., the "public issue") made in
connection with securing the approval of the governmental agency charged
with deciding between the projects. This seems a bit of a stretch.
187. Id. at400.
188. See id. at 401-02; see also Foothills Townhome Ass'n, 65 Cal. App. 4th
at 696, 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 520.
189. See Los Carneros, 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 401.
190. See id. Indeed, the court believed that the effect of the alleged contract
would "stifle[] the open public debate the anti-SLAPP statute was designed to
encourage" because it would silence any criticism of the defendant-company's
project by the expert Id.
191. See id. at402.
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The California Supreme Court accepted review of Los Carneros,
then deferred action while it considered Briggs.192  A few months
later the court dismissed the review and remanded the case to the
court of appeal pursuant to a settlement notice and request for dis-
missal by the parties. 193 Given the settlement, there will be no recon-
sideration by the appellate court. However, the original view of the
Los Carneros court that "not every lawsuit between parties who ap-
pear before legislative or executive bodies on some common issue is
a SLAPP suit' 194 would still seem sound, given the legislative intent
of section 425.16(a): to attack the "increase in lawsuits brought pri-
marily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of free-
dom of speech and petition for the redress of grievances." 19
C. The SLAPPer's Burden of Proof'96
Once the defendant shows that the lawsuit is within section
425.16 and thus subject to the motion to strike, the court should grant
the motion unless the plaintiff can show a probability of prevail-
ing. 197 Although the statute provides no explanation of the standard
the courts should use in making that determination, courts have ac-
cepted the analysis of Wilcox v. Superior Court,'98 which held that
the legislature did not intend a lower standard than "reasonable prob-
ability." 99 The Wilcox court concluded that section 425.16 required
192. See Los Carneros Community Assocs. v. Penfield & Smith Eng'rs, Inc.,
966 P.2d 441, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 407 (1998).
193. See Los Cameros Community Assocs. v. Penfield & Smith Eng'rs, Inc.,
970 P.2d 409, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 835 (1999).
194. Los Carneros, 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 402.
195. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(a) (West Supp. 2000).
196. For a general discussion of the SLAPPer's burden of proof, see 5
WITKIN PROCEDURE, supra note 59, § 963(a)(5).
197. See CAL. CIr. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1).
198. 27 Cal. App. 4th 809, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 446 (Ct App. 1994).
199. Id. at 823-25,33 CaL Rptr. 2dat 454-55. The court in Church of Scientol-
ogy v. Wollersheim, 42 Cal. App. 4th 628,49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 620 (Ct App. 1996),
stated that the following cases have adopted the Wilcox analysis: Evans v.
Unkow, 38 Cal. App. 4th 1490, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 624 (Ct App. 1995), Lafayette
Morehouse, Inc. v. Chronicle Publ'g Co., 39 Cal. App. 4th 1379, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d
542 (Ct App. 1995), Ludwig v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. App. 4th 8, 43 Cal. Rptr.
2d 350 (Ct. App. 1995), Robertson v. Rodriguez, 36 Cal. App. 4th 347, 42 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 464 (Ct App. 1995), and Dixon v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. App. 4th 733,
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"the plaintiff to demonstrate sufficient facts to establish a prima facie
case, ' 2°° including "showing the defendant's purported constitutional
defenses are not applicable to the case as a matter of law or by a
prima facie showing of facts which, if accepted by the trier of fact,
would negate such defenses."' 0'
Concerning the SLAPPer's burden of proof, the California Su-
preme Court has noted:
The Legislature . . . has provided, and California courts
have recognized, substantive and procedural limitations that
protect plaintiffs against overbroad application of the anti-
SLAPP mechanism. As we [previously] recognized[,] ...
"This court and the Courts of Appeal, noting the potential
deprivation of jury trial that might result were [section
425.16 and similar] statutes construed to require the plain-
tiff first to prove the specified claim to the trial court, have
instead read the statutes as requiring the court to determine
only if the plaintiff has stated and substantiated a legally
sufficient claim
20 2
36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 687 (Ct App. 1994). See Church of Scientology, 42 Cal. App.
4th at 654, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 635.
200. The Wilcox reading of the "probability" standard as requiring only a
"prima facie" showing of proof has been criticized as wrong, too lenient, and
contrary to the legislative intent See PRING & CANAN, supra note 29, at 198;
Mark Goldowitz, The Practitioner: Recent Appellate Case Upholds Califor-
nia 's Anti-SLAPP Law, L.A. DAILY J., Sept 27, 1994, at 7.
201. Wilcox, 27 Cal. App. 4th at 824, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 455. The plaintiff
made this type of showing in Peters v. Saunders, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 690, 696 (Ct
App. 1996), by demonstrating that some of the defendant's statements were de-
famatory and thus not in furtherance of his First Amendment rights. Interestingly,
in Marich v. QRZ Media, Inc., 73 Cal. App. 4th 299, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 406 (Ct.
App. 1999), plaintiffs failed to offer any declaration or affidavit to meet their bur-
den of proof. Nevertheless, the court found that a videotape, of which the court
had taken judicial notice at the defendant's request, demonstrated a prima facie
case of invasion of privacy by intrusion as well as a violation of the California
statute proscribing nonconsensual recording of a conversation. See id. at 307,
318-19, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 412, 420.
202. Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope and Opportunity, 19 Cal. 4th 1106,
1122-23, 969 P.2d 564, 574-75, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 471, 481 (1999) (quoting
Rosenthal v. Great W. Fin. Sec. Corp., 14 Cal. 4th 394, 412, 926 P.2d 1061, 1071,
58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 875, 885 (1996)) (citations and emphasis omitted); see also
Marich, 73 Cal. App. 4th at 306 n.2, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 411 n.2 ("This procedure
does not deny the constitutional right to a jury trial because the court does not
weigh the evidence in ruling upon the motion; instead, it simply determines
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To be of benefit to SLAPPees, the procedure for deciding the
motion is supposed to be fast and inexpensive.0 3 However, to meet
due process considerations, the plaintiff's burden must be compatible
with the fact that the motion is brought within sixty days of the com-
plaint's filing.20 4
The SLAPPer's showing must be made by "competent admissi-
ble evidence within the personal knowledge of the declarant."20 5
Averments on information and belief are thus insufficient,0 6 as is
hearsay and irrelevant information. °7 Each being inadmissible at
trial, they cannot be used to show a probability of prevailing. If the
SLAPPer presents competent, admissible evidence of the probability
of prevailing, the court will then consider any defenses raised in the
SLAPPee's affidavits in reaching its final determination of the
SLAPPer's probability of success. 208  If it is determined that a
SLAPPer has a probability of prevailing, that determination is not
whether a prima facie case has been made which warrants the lawsuit going for-
ward.").
203. See Wilcox, 27 Cal. App. 4th at 823, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 454 (noting that
the statute was intended to provide "a fast and inexpensive unmasking and
dismissal of SLAPPs").
204. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(f) (West Supp. 2000). The motion
may be brought at a later point with the court's permission. See id.
205. Ludwig v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. App. 4th 8, 15, 43 CaL Rptr. 2d 350,
356 (Ct App. 1995); accord Church of Scientology, 42 Cal. App. 4th at 654, 49
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 635; see also DuPont Merck Pharm. Co. v. Superior Court 78
Cal. App. 4th 562, 567-68, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 755, 759-60 (Ct App. 2000) (requir-
ing plaintiffs to substantiate their claim with more than the mere argument that
judges in similar cases had denied motions to dismiss and motions for summary
judgment; nor could plaintiffs substantiate their claim with the argument that the
instant complaint had survived a demurrer).
206. See Evans, 38 Cal. App. 4th at 1498,45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 629.
207. See Church ofScientology, 42 Cal. App. 4th at 656-57, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
637.
208. See id. at 658, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 638; see also CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §
425.16(b)(2) (noting that the court shall consider both "supporting and opposing
affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based") (emphasis
added); Wilcox, 27 Cal. App. 4th at 824,33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 455 (finding that sec-
tion 425.16 requires the SLAPPer to establish a prima facie case, including
"showing the defendant's purported constitutional defenses are not applicable to
the case as a matter of law or by a prima facie showing of facts which, if accepted
by the trier of fact, would negate such defenses').
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admissible at any later stage of the matter, nor does it alter the bur-
den or degree of proof at such later stage.2 °9
D. Stay of Discovey 210
Section 425.16(g) provides that "[a]ll discovery proceedings in
the action shall be stayed upon the filing of a notice of motion made
pursuant to this section.",21' However, subsection (g) also allows that
"[the court, on noticed motion and for good cause shown, may order
that specified discovery be conducted notwithstanding this subdivi-
sion., 212 The provision allowing discovery for good cause was the
legislature's way of balancing a SLAPPee's interest in a speedy deci-
sion on the nature of the suit without causing undue prejudice to the
SLAPPer.213
Unless the SLAPPer makes a timely request for discovery pur-
suant to subsection (g), there is no entitlement to discovery,21 4 and
209. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(3).
210. For a brief discussion of the stay of discovery under section 425.16, see
5 WITKIN PROCEDURE, supra note 59, § 962(e), at 423.
211. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(g).
212. Id.
213. See Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim, 42 Cal. App. 4th 628, 647
n.3, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 620, 631 n.3 (Ct App. 1996).
214. See Marich v. QRZ Media, Inc., 73 Cal. App. 4th 299, 309 n.5, 86 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 406, 413 n.5 (Ct App. 1999) (holding that the trial court's denial of dis-
covery was proper where plaintiffs had not brought a noticed discovery motion
and only mentioned their discovery request in their opposition motion; therefore,
the request did not demonstrate good cause that discovery was needed); Braun v.
Chronicle Publ'g Co., 52 Cal. App. 4th 1036, 1052, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 58, 67 (Ct.
App. 1997) (holding that where plaintiff orally requested discovery at the hearing
on defendant's motion to strike, it "was not a timely and properly noticed motion
for discovery, supported by a showing of good cause" and "failure to comply with
[section 425.16(g)] dooms the discovery request"); Evans v. Unkow, 38 Cal. App.
4th 1490, 1499, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 624, 630 (Ct App. 1995) (finding a lack of
timely compliance with the statute and a lack of good cause shown for untimeli-
ness where the SLAPPer-plaintiff had not requested discovery until he moved for
reconsideration of the trial court's granting of defendant's motion to strike and
where his sole excuse for the belated request was his assumption that he would
prevail on the motion); Lafayette Morehouse, Inc. v. Chronicle Publ'g Co., 37
Cal. App. 4th 855, 867, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 46, 53-54 (Ct App. 1995) (holding that
where plaintiff has failed to make a timely notice for specified discovery, due
process rights are not violated despite the lack of opportunity for discovery); Rob-
ertson v. Rodriguez, 36 Cal. App. 4th 347, 357, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 464, 469 (Ct
App. 1995) (holding that plaintiff does not adequately comply with section
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discovery will be barred until the entry of the order on the motion to
strike. 15 If the motion is granted, the lawsuit will end. Even where
a proper motion is made, the courts must examine the nature of the
discovery requested to see if its extent "would subvert the intent of
the anti-SLAPP legislation., 216 As one court has noted: "Obviously,
the purpose of the statute would be frustrated if the plaintiff could
drag on proceedings for many months by claiming a need to conduct
additional investigation. 2 17 Thus, requiring a SLAPPer to have suf-
ficient facts to support a claim before filing a lawsuit supports sec-
tion 425.16's statutory purpose.218 However, another court has em-
phasized in dictum that a court should "liberally exercise its
discretion" to allow specified discovery, especially "when evidence
to establish a prima facie case is reasonably shown to be held, or
known, by defendant[-SLAPPee] or its agents and employees.,
21 9
425.16(g)'s requirement of a noticed motion by merely asserting in an opposition
to a motion to strike the need for more time to ascertain facts and take deposi-
tions).
215. See CAL. Cry. PROC. CODE § 425.16(g).
216. Sipple v. Foundation for Nat'l Progress, 71 Cal. App. 4th 226, 247, 83
Cal. Rptr. 2d 677, 690 (Ct App. 1999) (affirming the trial court's denial of dis-
covery where plaintiff sought both written discovery and depositions of 16
people with no explanation of what he intended to uncover or why he needed
"such far-ranging discovery," except for an argument that "he should be 'per-
mitted to test respondents' self-serving declarations and elicit circumstantial
evidence through discovery'); see also Nicosia v. DeRooy, 72 F. Supp. 2d
1093, 1111 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (granting a section 425.16 motion to strike and
refusing to permit discovery where the plaintiff's allegations of malice failed to
state a claim, and where he also failed to demonstrate that either the defendant
or a witness possessed evidence to support his allegations).
217. Ludwig v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. App. 4th 8, 16, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 350,
356 (Ct App. 1995).
218. See id. at23 n.23, 43 Cal. Rpr. 2d at 361 n.23.
219. Lafayette Morehouse, 37 Cal. App. 4th at 867-68, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 54
(finding that plaintiff had not been disadvantaged by section 425.16(g)'s discov-
ery limitations where plaintiff failed to make a timely motion and never sought
any discovery, even though the case had been pending one year); see also Judge
Reverses Court Victory of Former Police Chief Willie Williams; Says Williams
Must be Deposed in $20 Million Slander/Invasion of Privacy Lawsuit Brought by
Two Veteran LAPD Detectives, PR NEwswIRE (Feb. 23, 1999) (discussing the
reversal of a trial judge's decision that plaintiffs had insufficient evidence to
establish the probability of prevailing on claims of slander and invasion of pri-
vacy; the appellate court found the decision premature where plaintiffs had had
no chance to depose defendant to explore his motives).
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E. Attorney's Fee 2
20
Section 425.16(c) provides:
[A] prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike shall
be entitled to recover his or her attorney's fees and
costs. 2213 If the court finds that a special motion to strike is
frivolous or is solely intended to cause unnecessary delay,
the court shall award costs and reasonable attorney's fees to
a plaintiff prevailing on the motion, pursuant to Section
128.5.222
220. For a brief discussion on the right to attorney's fees and costs under
section 425.16, see 5 WrrKIN PROCEDURE, supra note 59, § 962(c), at 422.
221. Some commentators have suggested that this remedy for the SLAPPee of
attorney's fees and costs may not be enough. See Barker, supra note 11, at 452
(suggesting that damages, over and above mere litigation costs and attorney's
fees, should be included in a prevailing party's recovery to compensate for legiti-
mate emotional distress and other actual tort injury); Jerome I. Braun, Increasing
SLAPP Protection: Unburdening the Right of Petition in California, 32 U.C.
DAvIs L. REv. 965, 1062 (1999) (proposing an amendment to section 425.16 that
would echo the verification and sanction requirements of Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure). Other useful modifications to assist a SLAPPee could
include requiring specific pleading, eliminating the public interest connection re-
quirement, heightening the plaintiffs burden to a showing of substantial prob-
ability, providing the state with the discretion to intervene on behalf of the defen-
dant if the state would statutorily be a necessary party to the action, and having
defendant's discovery costs advanced by the plaintiff where the plaintiff survives
the initial motion but the court still sees the possibility of a SLAPP motive. See
also infra Appendix 3, notes 388-95 and accompanying text (discussing JUDICIAL
COUNCIL SLAPP REPORT, supra note 8, Recommendation 7, to amend statute to
increase sanctions).
222. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(c) (West Supp. 2000). The phrase "pur-
suant to Section 128.5" may cause problems, as the referenced provision applies
only to cases filed before 1995. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.5(b)(1); see
also In re the Marriage of Drake, 53 Cal. App. 4th 1139, 1169, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d
466, 486 (Ct. App. 1997) (finding a sanctions award proper in a proceeding aris-
ing out of a 1995 petition for increased child support because the underlying di-
vorce occurred prior to 1961, when sanctions were not yet barred by a time limit).
It is unclear whether the legislature intended section 425.16(c) to apply by refer-
ence only to cases filed before 1995, or whether it meant that "frivolous" and
"unnecessary delay" in section 425.16(c) should be interpreted the same way as in
section 128.5. If the latter is true, case law under section 128.5 shows that courts
award sanctions only in particularly egregious circumstances. See Tenderloin
Hous. Clinic, Inc. v. Sparks, 8 Cal. App. 4th 299, 308, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 371, 375-
76 (Ct App. 1992) (sanctioning plaintiff's attorney for "frivolous actions and tac-
tics" when he engaged in a strategy that forced the defendant's attorney to pre-
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Despite the absence of the term "reasonable" in co'nnection with the
amount of attorney's fees a prevailing defendant can recover, the
Robertson v. Rodriguez223 court concluded that either prevailing
party is limited to an award of reasonable fees, which amount is
within the court's discretion.22 " A prevailing defendant is entitled to
attorney's fees even if a third party paid defense costs.
225
A SLAPPee can be considered the prevailing party and entitled
to attorney's fees even where a SLAPPer voluntarily dismissed the
claims before the hearing on the SLAPPee's motion to strike.226
However, a SLAPPer's voluntary dismissal after the filing of a sec-
tion 425.16 motion neither automatically mandates an award of at-
torney's fees, nor automatically precludes it. There must be a hear-
ing to determine who is the prevailing party.227 Also, governmental
maturely return from a long-scheduled vacation of which plaintiff's attorney was
well aware). This could work to the advantage of SLAPP defendants, however.
223. 36 Cal. App. 4th 347,42 Cal. Rptr. 2d464 (Ct App. 1995).
224. See id. at 360-62, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 471-72. The Church of Scientology
court accepted the reasonableness standard, stating:
In determining what constitutes a reasonable compensation for an at-
torney who has rendered services in connection with a legal proceed-
ing, the court may and should consider "the nature of the litigation, its
difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required and the skill em-
ployed in handling the litigation, the attention given, the success of the
attorney's efforts, his learning, his age, and his experience in the par-
ticular type of work demanded... ; the intricacies and importance of
the litigation, the labor and necessity for skilled legal training and
ability in trying the cause, and the time consumed."
Church ofScientology, 42 Cal. App. 4th at 659, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 638-39 (quot-
ing Stokus v. Marsh, 217 Cal. App. 3d 647, 656-67, 266 Cal. Rptr. 90, 96 (Ct.
App. 1990)).
225. See Macias v. Hartwell, 55 Cal. App. 4th 669, 675-76, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d
222, 226 (Ct. App. 1997).
226. See Coltrain v. Shewalter, 66 Cal. App. 4th 94, 107, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d
600, 608 (Ct App. 1998); see also Kyle v. Carmon, 71 Cal. App. 4th 901, 917-
18, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 303, 313-15 (Ct App. 1999) (finding that an order grant-
ing a SLAPP motion following plaintiff's voluntary dismissal is void, but that
the adjudication supported an award of attorney's fees without need for re-
mand); Liu v. Moore, 69 Cal. App. 4th 745, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 807 (Ct. App.
1999) (holding that where the alleged SLAPPer dismisses the suit before the
hearing on the SLAPPee's motion to strike, the SLAPPee has the right to have
a hearing so that attorney's fees and cost can be awarded if the SLAPPee pre-
vails).
227. See Liu, 69 Cal. App. 4th at 752, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 812. It should also
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agencies are viewed as persons under section 425.16 and can thus be
prevailing SLAPPee defendants entitled to attorney's fees.
228
Awards for attorney's fees for motions to strike have ranged from a
low of $3000229 to a high of $130,506.71.230 The average attorney
fee awards range from $15,000 to $40,000.231
By its terms, section 425.16 neither expressly includes nor ex-
cludes costs and attorney's fees incurred prior to an order granting or
denying a special motion but not directly attributable to it.232 One
be noted that the statute of limitations for a SLAPPee's commencing a mali-
cious prosecution action begins when the hearing determines the SLAPPee is
the prevailing party, not when the voluntary dismissal occurs. See Garrison v.
Baker, No. 98-17038, 2000 WL 206575, at *1 (9th Cir. Feb. 23, 2000) (hold-
ing that "[if] the dismissal terminated the action, we would be allowing the
plaintiff to unilaterally prevent a decision on the merits, thereby precluding the
defendant in the underlying suit from ever asserting a malicious prosecution
clainf').
228. See Mission Oaks Ranch, Ltd. v. County of Santa Barbara, 65 Cal. App.
4th 713, 729-30, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1, 11 (Ct App. 1998), disapproved on other
grounds by Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity, 19 Cal. 4th 1106,
969 P.2d 564, 81 Cal. Rplr. 2d471 (1999).
229. See Matson v. Dvorak, 40 Cal. App. 4th 539, 545-46, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d
880, 884-85 (Ct App. 1995) (awarding a SLAPPee $2200 and $800, respec-
tively, in attorney's fees for the two motions to strike that he had to bring
against claims in the original and amended complaints, plus costs).
230. See Church of Scientology, 42 Cal. App. 4th at 658-59, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
638-39 (Ct App. 1996) (finding that substantial evidence supported the six-figure
award, and noting that the court had declined the movant's request to double the
"lodestar" amount).
231. See Macias, 55 Cal. App. 4th at 675-76, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 226
(awarding $44,445); Braun v. Chronicle Publ'g Co., 52 Cal. App. 4th 1036,
1052-53, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 58, 67 (Ct App. 1997) (awarding $17,879); Dove
Audio, Inc. v. Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman, 47 Cal. App. 4th 777, 785, 54 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 830, 835 (Ct App. 1996) (awarding over $27,000); Rodriguez, 36 Cal.
App. 4th 347, 360-61, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 464, 471-72 (awarding $15,000, re-
duced from a claim of $23,847). Consultants for the Judicial Council's report
to the legislature on SLAPPs noted that in six SLAPP cases where the motion
to strike had been granted, attorney's fees and cost awards ranged from zero to
$37,000. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL SLAPP REPORT, supra note 8, Attachment 2,
at 4 (commenting on Attachment 5).
232. See CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 425.16(c) (West Supp. 2000) ("[A] pre-
vailing defendant on a special motion to strike shall be entitled to recover his
or her attorney's fees and costs."). Examples of actions for which attorney's
fees and costs may be incurred, but which are not directly attributable to the
special motion to strike, are preparing and filing an answer in order to preserve
defenses, transferring the case to the proper venue, and responding to discov-
ery, if allowed. See Telephone Interview with Mark Goldowitz, Director of the
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court has limited the award of attorney's fees and costs to only those
spent on the special motion to strike, reversing the award for costs
and fees associated with other aspects of the case.233 Yet the court of
appeal, on remand, granted recovery of costs associated with discov-
ery in the Briggs case2 34 because "[w]here, as here, discovery is al-
lowed for the purpose of assisting the plaintiff in defending against
the motion, the fees attributable to such discovery are directly related
to the motion to dismiss, and are recoverable under the anti-SLAPP
statute.
' 235
Section 425.16 also does not expressly provide for an award of
attorney's fees and costs for any appeal of an order granting or de-
nying a special motion to strike. However, the courts of appeal have
allowed prevailing SLAPPees to recover attorney's fees and costs for
both the motion and the successful appeal. 6
California Anti-SLAPP Project and sole practitioner specializing in section
425.16 defense (Jan. 4, 2000).
233. See Lafayette Morehouse, Inc. v. Chronicle Publ'g Co., 39 Cal. App. 4th
1379, 1383-84, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 542, 544 (Ct App. 1995). In reaching this con-
clusion, the Lafayette Morehouse court quoted the legislative history for section
425.16(c): "'[SB 1264] would provide attorney's fees and costs to a prevailing
defendant in a motion to strike.... The provision applies only to the motion to
strike, and not to the entire action."' Id. at 1383, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 544 (quoting
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY, ANALYSIS OF SB
1264, at 5 (1991-92 Reg. Sess.)).
234. In Briggs, the trial judge had allowed discovery after the SLAPPee filed
its section 425.16 special motion to strike. The SLAPPer took twelve deposi-
tions. See Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity, No. A072446 &
A074357, slip op. at 14 (Cal. Ct App. Oct 19, 1999) [hereinafter Briggs 11].
On remand, the plaintiffs tried to argue that the SLAPPee should bear the costs
of complying with discovery requests, but the appellate court disagreed and
affirmed the trial court's original award of over $70,000 for costs and attorney
fees. See id. at 15.
235. Id. at 14. In order to fully implement the purposes of the statute,
SLAPPees should be able to recover all costs and fees associated with a lawsuit
found to be a SLAPP. George W. Pring and Penelope Canan, consultants for
the Judicial Council's SLAPP report, recommended that the statute be
amended "to extend attorney's fees to cover the full costs that filers have im-
posed on targets." JUDICIAL COUNCIL SLAPP REPORT, supra note 8, at 4 &
Attachment 2, at 12; see infra Appendix 3, notes 364-65 and accompanying
text (discussing Recommendation 2).
236. See Church of Scientology, 42 Cal. App. 4th at 658-59,49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
638-39; Evans v. Unkow, 38 Cal. App. 4th 1490, 1499-1500, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d
624, 630 (Ct. App. 1995). Both courts relied on the principle that a statute
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The granting of SLAPPee attorney's fees has raised most of the
issues concerning this part of the legislation. There is very little law
concerning the award of attorney's fees and costs to the SLAPPer
probably because more often than not the California courts have ul-
timately ruled in favor of the SLAPPee. Even in those cases pre-
Briggs which reversed the granting of a SLAPPee's motion to strike
on the basis that the acts were outside of section 425.16, only one
case was remanded to the trial court with instructions to consider the
SLAPPer's entitlement to attorney's fees and costs. 23 7 Recently a
federal district court concluded that section 425.16 did not apply to
state law counterclaims that a plaintiff had attempted to strike by
special motion.238 Nevertheless, the court declined to award attor-
ney's fees to the defendants because it was unclear whether the
authorizing attorney's fees at the trial court level includes appellate fees unless the
statute specifically provides otherwise. See Church of Scientology, 42 Cal. App.
4th at 659, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 639; Evans, 38 Cal. App. 4th at 1499, 45 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 630; see also Liu, 69 Cal. App. 4th 745, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 807 (noting that
while a prevailing SLAPPee is entitled to attorney's fees-including appellate
fees-such fees are not rewardable for interim appellate success but are de-
ferred until final resolution of the matter); Dove Audio, 47 Cal. App. 4th at
785, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 835 (explaining that since a statute provides for attor-
ney's fees to the prevailing movant and does not proscribe appellate fees, those
fees are recoverable); accord Briggs II, No. A072446 & A074357, slip op. at
17.
237. See Ericsson GE Mobile Communications, Inc. v. C.S.I. Telecomms.
Eng'rs, 49 Cal. App. 4th 1591, 1604, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 491, 498 (Ct App.
1996), disapproved by Briggs, 19 Cal. 4th 1106, 969 P.2d 564, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d
471 (1999). In the other cases reversed or disapproved by Briggs, the remand
simply directed the trial court to award the SLAPPer costs of appeal. See Briggs
v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity, 54 CaL App. 4th 1237, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d
434, 439 (Ct App. 1997), rev'd, 19 Cal. 4th 1106, 969 P.2d 564, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d
471 (1999); Linsco/Private Ledger, Inc. v. Investors Arbitration Servs., Inc., 50
Cal. App. 4th 1633, 1640, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 613, 617 (Ct App. 1996); Zhao v.
Wong, 48 Cal. App. 4th 1114, 1133, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 909, 921 (Ct. App. 1996).
Both the Linsco/Private Ledger, Inc. and Zhao cases were disapproved by Briggs,
19 Cal. 4th 1106, 969 P.2d 564, 81 CaL Rptr. 2d 471. Briggs also disapproved
Mission Oaks Ranch, 65 Cal. App. 4th 713, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1 (Ct App. 1998),
but Mission Oaks Ranch had actually affirmed the judgment of dismissal under
section 425.16. See supra note 100. However; the trial court in Mission Oaks
Ranch had denied attorney's fees and costs to the SLAPPee because it was a
government agency; thus the remand instructed the trial court to determine and
award attorney's fees. See 65 Cal. App. 4th at 730-31, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 12.
238. See Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Computer Group, Inc., 63 F.
Supp. 2d 1127, 1130 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
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motion was frivolous or intended to cause delay, given that several of




Until passage of the October 1999 amendment, a SLAPPee had
no right of appeal if the special motion to strike was denied.240 The
SLAPPee could seek a writ of mandate, but, as noted in the amend-
ment's legislative history, courts rarely granted such writs. 241 By
contrast, if the motion was granted, a SLAPPer could always appeal
the dismissal of the case. Section 425.160) now levels that playing
field.242
G. Summary of Ninth Circuit Case Law Pertaining
to Section 425.16
Together, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit and the Ninth Circuit's United States district courts in California
issued a combined total of six reported decisions in 1999 concerning
section 425.16's applicability to cases brought in federal court.2 43 In
these cases, section 425.16 has been applied to state law issues, but
239. See id.
240. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (West Supp. 1997).
241. See ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY,
COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1675, at 2-3 (Apr. 20, 1999); SENATE JUDICIARY
COMMITTEE, CALIFORNIA SENATE, COMMITrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1675, at 4
(June 29, 1999); see also supra note 42.
242. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.160) (West Supp. 2000) ("An order
granting or denying a special motion to strike shall be appealable under
§ 904.1.").
243. See infra notes 244-91 and accompanying text A seventh federal
opinion, Garrison v. Baker, No. 98-17038, 2000 WL 206575 (9th Cir. Feb. 23,
2000), dealt with section 425.16 in a procedural, not substantive way. Garri-
son was a malicious prosecution action brought in federal court by a SLAPPee
following a California trial court's ruling that a libel suit was a section 425.16
SLAPP and award of SLAPPee attorney's fees despite the SLAPPer's volun-
tary dismissal. See id. at *1. The Ninth Circuit in Garrison only discussed
section 425.16 in the context of determining that the SLAPPee had timely filed
the malicious prosecution action given that the statute of limitations did not
begin running until the trial court's ruling on the merits of the SLAPP. See id.
at *1-2.
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its full efficacy is in question because some district courts have been
inclined to view the statute narrowly. This section summarizes those
decisions.
1. Ninth Circuit decisions
In Frias v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation
Authority,2 " the Ninth Circuit considered, inter alia, an appeal by the
plaintiff of the district court's order dismissing his state tort action
for failure to state a claim and granting two defendants attorney's
fees under section 425.16; the court also granted two defendants'
cross-appeal of the reduction of their claimed attorney's fees.
2 45
Without much discussion, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the two defen-
dants were entitled to attorney's fees because they had prevailed in
their dismissal motion, notwithstanding that the district court had not
specifically referred to section 425.16 in its order.246 The court also
agreed that the district court had abused its discretion by reducing the
attorney's fee claim by over fifty percent.247 The court remanded the
matter for more careful consideration of the claim.248
By contrast, United States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles
& Space Co. 249 considered in depth the application of section 425.16
to state law counterclaims in an action by qui tam plaintiffs under the
False Claim Act. 50 The Ninth Circuit carefully considered whether
section 425.16 would conflict with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
8, 12, and 56. The only parts of section 425.16 at issue were subsec-
tions (b) (the motion to strike) and (c) (the availability of attorney's
fees and costs). 2 5 1 Although noting that there was some similarity in
purpose--"the expeditious weeding out of meritless claims before
trial"-the court concluded that Rules 8, 12, and 56 were not "in-
tended to 'occupy the field.' 2 2 Finding no "direct collision" be-
tween the state provision and the Federal Rules, the court concluded
244. No. 97-56078, 1999 WL 273152 (9th Cir. Mar. 11, 1999).
245. See id. at *1.
246. See id. at *2.
247. See id.
248. See id. at *3.
249. 171 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 1999), amended by 190 F.3d 963 (9th Cir. 1999).
250. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (1994).
251. See Lockheed, 190 F.3d at 972 & n.11.
252. Id. at 972.
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that the qui tam plaintiffs could assert a motion to strike the defen-
dants' counterclaims and claim attorney's fees and costs under the
California anti-SLAPP statute.2 53 In so ruling, the court noted that if
the anti-SLAPP statute did not apply in federal court, "a litigant in-
terested in bringing meritless SLAPP claims would have a significant
incentive to shop for a federal forum," and conversely a SLAPPee
would be considerably disadvantaged in federal court.25a The court
saw this as an inappropriate result under the Erie doctrine.
2 15
2. District court decisions in the Ninth Circuit
In addition to the federal district court opinions underlying the
Ninth Circuit opinions discussed above,256 four other Ninth Circuit
district courts have applied California's anti-SLAPP statute since
Lockheed. 7 Two of these district court opinions took a narrower
view of the applicability of section 425.16 in federal court cases than
might be expected after the analysis afforded by Lockheed.
Citing Lockheed, the United States District Court for the North-
ern District of California, in Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan
Computer Group, Inc., 25 agreed that section 425.16 is applicable to
state law claims.259 The court declined, however, to apply the Cali-
fornia provision to federal question claims in a case where there were
also pendent state claims, noting only a lack of support for this con-
clusion in the Lockheed court's Erie analysis or any other authority
253. See id. at 973.
254. Id.
255. See id.
256. Only Lockheed had a reported district court opinion. See United States
ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., No. C88-20009JW, 1995
WL 470218 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 1995) (applying the Erie doctrine and denying
plaintiffs' motion to strike and for attorney's fees pursuant to section 425.16 of
the California Code of Civil Procedure on the basis that the statute conflicted
with Rules 8, 1, and 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure), rev'd in part,
190 F.3d 963 (9th Cir. 1999).
257. While the Lockheed opinion was amended after both of these district
court opinions were issued, the discussion of section 425.16 in the revised
Lockheed decision was not altered. See Lockheed, 190 F.3d 963 (9th Cir. 1999),
amending 171 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 1999).
258. 63 F. Supp. 2d 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
259. See id. at 1130.
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known to the court.26' The court then examined the statements un-
derlying the claims at issue in the section 425.16 motion to strike; the
plaintiff had made these statements "to the market" about the prod-
ucts of its competitor defendants. 26' The court observed that the
statements "were not made during or in connection with an official
proceeding" and thus could be protected by the statute "only if they
[could] be characterized as statements made in a place open to the
public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public inter-
est., 262 Unable to locate any similar California case and expressing
disbelief that the California legislature intended the statute to attack
as a SLAPP "any lawsuit alleging trade libel, false advertising or the
like in the context of commercial competition," the court declined to
apply section 425.16 to plaintiff's statement.263 However, the court
also refused to award attorney's fees and costs to the defendants be-
cause it was unclear that plaintiff s motion was frivolous or intended
for delay.
264
The United States District Court for the Central District of Cali-
fornia was the other federal district court which took a narrow view
of section 425.16. In Rogers v. Home Shopping Network, Inc.,265 one
defendant, the National Enquirer, had published an article containing
allegedly known false statements about the plaintiff.266 When plain-
tiff sued for libel, the National Enquirer brought a section 425.16
motion to strike.267 The plaintiff filed an ex parte application seeking
a continuance of the motion hearing, arguing that she had insufficient
time for discovery and identifying specific discovery that she needed,
including information from the defendant concerning its knowledge
at the time it published the article. 268 Although the Rogers court rec-
ognized that Lockheed had held that section 425.16 fell within an
260. See id.
261. See id. The court did not give any other factual detail about the claims
because the full factual background had been provided in prior orders. See id.
at 1128.
262. Id. at 1130.
263. Id.
264. See id.; see also supra notes 23 8-39 and accompanying text.
265. 57 F. Supp. 2d 973 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
266. See id. at 974.
267. See id.
268. See id. at 974, 985.
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Erie exception, it chose to view Lockheed's consideration of only
sections 425.16(b) and (c) very narrowly in considering the applica-
bility of section 425.16(f) (the timing of the special strike motion's
filing and hearing) and (g) (the discovery stay).269 The court then
concluded that while a special motion to strike can be available in
federal court, "the manner in which these motions are presented and
considered must comport with federal standards. 2 70 The court found
that the federal standards were different from those of section
425.16.271 In particular, the court ruled:
If a defendant makes a [section 425.16] special motion to
strike based on alleged deficiencies in the plaintiffs com-
plaint, the motion must be treated in the same manner as a
motion under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 12(b)(6)
except that the attorney's fee provision of § 425.16(c) ap-
plies. If a defendant makes a special motion to strike based
on the plaintiffs alleged failure of proof, the motion must
be treated in the same manner as a motion under Rule 56
except that again the attorney's fees provision of
§ 425.16(c) applies. 272
Based on its views that there were colliding differences between the
standards of section 425.16 and the standards of the federal rules, the
court continued the motion to strike hearing to allow the plaintiff
time for discovery.273
The Rogers court's conclusion is troubling because it totally
misunderstands the unique nature of the section 425.16 special
269. See id. at 979-80; see also supra note 251 and accompanying text.
270. Rogers, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 981.
271. See id. at 981-82 (finding that section 425.16 and Rule 56(f) have dif-
ferent purposes, the former being discovery-limiting and the latter being dis-
covery-allowing); id. at 982-83 (also determining that section 425.16 was in
conflict with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 12).
272. Id. at 983. In particular, the court noted that "[i]f a defendant desires to
make a special motion to strike based on the plaintiffs lack of evidence, the
defendant may not do so until discovery has been developed sufficiently to
permit summary judgment under Rule 56." Id. at 982.
273. See id. at 985. Besides having the costs of discovery imposed on it the
defendant National Enquirer was also subject to a motion to compel disclosure
of confidential sources, which it was able to successfully defend. See Rogers
v. Home Shopping Network, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 1140 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
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motion to strike, which Lockheed expressly recognized. 274 A defen-
dant does not bring a special motion because of deficiencies in the
complaint or because of the plaintiff s alleged lack of proof. The de-
fendant brings the motion to allege that the plaintiff is suing because
the defendant has made some statement or taken some action that is
protected under section 425.16 as a furtherance of the right to peti-
tion or free speech. Therefore, to try to shoehorn a section 425.16
motion into either a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss or a Rule 56
summary judgment is inappropriate.
The Rogers court's decision to grant discovery is also troubling
because of its breadth. The court did not limit the granting of a dis-
covery continuance of a section 425.16 hearing to the instant situa-
tion where the plaintiff claimed to be in need of information in the
defendant's control. It did not recognize that its broad ruling about
the method of handling discovery requests by a party served with a
section 425.16 motion in federal court undermines the statute's
unique purpose. Under the Rogers ruling, any SLAPPer subject to a
special motion to strike in federal court will be able to seek a con-
tinuance of the hearing in order to conduct discovery and thus will be
able to harass the SLAPPee with expensive discovery; the SLAPPee,
in turn, has no ability to get an early determination of the merits of
the SLAPP suit. The Rogers ruling will therefore encourage the very
kind of forum-shopping that Lockheed had tried to eliminate by rul-
ing that section 425.16 applied to state law claims in federal cases.275
Had the Rogers court actually appreciated the purpose and operation
of section 425.16(g) within the scheme of the statute, it could have
simply applied the section to the instant case. Given that the Rogers
plaintiff had made an application for discovery and identified spe-
cific discovery items, including an apparent explanation for why at
least one item was needed, the court could have determined whether
good cause was shown.276 If good cause was shown, any discovery
274. See Lockheed, 190 F.3d at 973 (noting that "[t]he Anti-SLAPP statute
... is crafted to serve an interest not directly addressed by the Federal Rules:
the protection of 'the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for
redress of grievances').
275. See id.
276. See supra text accompanying note 219 (quoting the exhortation of
Lafayette Morehouse, Inc. v. Chronicle Publ'g Co., 37 Cal. App. 4th 855, 868, 44
Cal. Rptr. 2d 46, 54 (Ct App. 1995), that courts should be liberal in allowing dis-
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the court deemed necessary could have been granted under the stat-
ute's standards.277
Rogers's granting of discovery stands in contrast to the ruling in
Nicosia v. DeRooy,278 another opinion by the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California. In Nicosia, the plaintiff
sued the defendant for slander and libel based on statements the de-
fendant had published about him on her Web site.279 The defendant
moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim under federal rules of
procedure and to strike under section 425.16.280 One ground of the
defendant's motion to dismiss under the federal rules was that the
plaintiff had insufficiently pled actual malice, a pleading requirement
in this situation, with which the court agreed.281  As a result, the
court also concluded that the plaintiff had failed his burden of proof
under section 425.16, which required him to show that he would
probably prevail on his claims.2 82 In considering the plaintiff's re-
quest to conduct limited discovery on the issue of actual malice, the
court noted that section 425.16 had been interpreted to allow trial
courts to "liberally allow requests for discovery. ' ,283 However, since
the court had already found plaintiffs allegations of actual malice in-
sufficient to state a claim, the court concluded that any evidence
marshaled to support such allegations could not establish malice and
thus could not meet his burden of proof.2 84  The court therefore
found that the plaintiff had failed to satisfy the requirement that he
covery "when evidence to establish a prima facie case is reasonably shown to be
held, or known, by defendant[-SLAPPee] or its agents and employees").
277. See CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 425.16(g) (West Supp. 2000).
278. 72 F. Supp. 2d 1093 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
279. See id. at 1096.
280. See id. at 1095.
281. See id. at 1108-09.
282. See id. at 1110.
283. Id. at 1111 (relying on Lafayette Morehouse, 37 Cal. App. 4th at 868,
44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 54).
284. See id. The Nicosia court acknowledged that discovery might allow the
plaintiff to uncover evidence to support a different theory of malice than he
had pled. However, the court concluded that "[t]he mere possibility that this
might occur... does not satisfy the standard articulated in [Lafayette More-
house] and [Sipple v. Foundation for National Progress]." Id. at n.12.
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demonstrate 'that a defendant or a witness possesses evidence need-
ed by plaintiff to establish a prima facie case.'
' 285
Nicosia predated Rogers by a couple of weeks, although it was
submitted for publication some time later.286 However, the fourth
federal district court opinion considering a section 425.16 special
motion to strike, Metabolife International, Inc. v. Wornick,25 7 was
aware of and seemed to accept the views of the Rogers court con-
cerning the supposed collision between federal motion rules and sec-
tion 425.16's standards. 288 As a result of the Rogers perspective, the
United States District Court for the Southern District of California in
Metabolife believed that it could not consider issues "for which [the
plaintiff] should be granted discovery prior to a decision" because
discovery had been stayed after the filing of the defendant's special
motion to strike.289 While the court thus felt it could not examine
whether Metabolife had established a prima facie case of actual
malice, it was nevertheless willing to consider the defendant's legal
defenses and whether Metabolife had met the required proof of fal-
sity in support of its claims of slander and defamation. 290 After a
careful analysis of each of the plaintiffs claims, the court ultimately
concluded that Metabolife did not meet its burden of showing a
probability of prevailing on any of them
291
These four federal district court decisions suggest that the vari-
ous California district courts' handling of section 425.16 special
285. Id. at 1111 (citing Sipple v. Foundation for Nat'l Progress, 71 Cal. App.
4th 226, 247, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 677, 690 (Ct App. 1999)).
286. Nicosia was decided on July 7, 1999, see 72 F. Supp. 2d at 1093, while
Rogers was decided on July 22, 1999, see 57 F. Supp. 2d at 973.
287. 72 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (S.D. Cal. 1999). In Metabolife, the plaintiff sued
a television station and others for slander, defamation and other claims after
the broadcast of a three-part report questioning the safety of the plaintiff's
herbal diet pills. See id. at 1162-63.
288. See id. at 1166 (quoting Rogers, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 982, for the principle
that "[i]n federal court, 'if a defendant desires to make a special motion to
strike based on the plaintiff's lack of evidence, the defendant may not do so
until discovery has been developed sufficiently to permit summary judgment
under Rule 56"').
289. See id. at 1165. In fact, the court had first stayed all discovery, then had
ordered limited discovery, but later stayed all discovery again. See id. at 1164-
65.
290. See id. at 1165-66 &n.3.
291. See id. at 1166-76.
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motions to strike may lack uniformity unless and until the Ninth Cir-
cuit deals with the issue more substantively than it did in Lockheed.
Until then, one can expect that forum shopping will occur because of
the dissimilar approaches taken by the different federal district courts
in ruling on section 425.16 special motions.
IV. JuDIciAL CoUNcIL REPORT ON SECTON 425.16
Pursuant to the directive in section 425.16(i), the Judicial Coun-
cil submitted a report to the legislature in 1999 concerning the op-
eration of the statute. 92 The statute called for a report "on the fre-
quency and outcome of special motions made pursuant to this
section, and on any other matters pertinent to the purposes of this
section. ' '293 The Judicial Council interpreted that mandate, in part, as
requesting a report on the statute's effectiveness.294 It therefore used
several different types of data collection in order to make an assess-
ment of the statute's use and operation.295 The Judicial Council's re-
search efforts were not very scientific, partly because the legislature
initially provided no funding for the study it had ordered.296 How-
ever, the legislature apparently did finally provide some funds to the
Judicial Council in order to hire SLAPP experts George W. Pring
and Penelope Canan as consultants to analyze the collected data.297
Based on their analysis of the limited data collected by the Judi-
cial Council, the consultants made seven recommendations to en-
hance the statutory protections of section 425.16:
(1) require the filing of a form for every special motion to
strike to permit reliable future research;
292. See generally JUDICIAL COUNCIL SLAPP REPORT, supra note 8.
293. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(i) (West Supp. 2000).
294. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL SLAPP REPORT, supra note 8, at 1; see also id.,
Attachment 7 (copy of form letter sent to counsel known to have litigated
SLAPP motions, asking their opinion on section 425.16's effectiveness "in
preventing or eliminating SLAPPs").
295. A full description of the Judicial Council's research methods can be
found in Appendix 3 infra.
296. See Telephone Interview with Mark Goldowitz, Director of the Califor-
nia Anti-SLAPP Project and sole practitioner specializing in section 425.16 de-
fense (Oct. 13, 1999).
297. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL SLAPP REPORT, supra note 8, at 2.
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(2) expand the attorney's fees section to cover all costs
"reasonably incurred in defending against the action";
(3) provide more discretion for the court concerning the
motion-filing deadline;
(4) permit an immediate appeal of a denial of a special mo-
tion to strike;
(5) clarify that the special motion to strike is inapplicable to
a SLAPP-back suit;
(6) clarify that discovery is disfavored by stating specific
factors to consider before lifting the discovery stay im-
posed by the filing of a special motion to strike; and
(7) expand the discretion of the court to impose additional
sanctions on SLAPPers and their attorneys or law
firms.
2 9 8
Although acknowledging that the consultants were the preeminent
experts on SLAPP suits, 299 the Judicial Council surprisingly rejected
most of their recommendations. It took the position that recommen-
dations 1 and 3-6 were unnecessary. 300 As to recommendation 2, the
Judicial Council conceded that section 425.16 was unclear concern-
ing the extent of attorney's fees and therefore agreed that a clarifica-
tion would be useful. However, the Judicial Council took no posi-
tion on what that clarification should be, declining to support the
consultants' specific recommendation.30' The Judicial Council also
did not endorse recommendation 7 and "[took] no position on the
substantive legal issue of whether additional sanctions should be
authorized., 30 2 A complete analysis of the seven recommendations
and a critique of the Judicial Council's reactions to them are pro-
vided in Appendix 3 to this Article.
V. IssuEs iN SECTION 425.16's OPERATION AND SCOPE
Since the publication of the Judicial Council's report, the legis-
lature has amended section 425.16 in a form that adopts Pring and
298. See id., Attachment 2, at 12.
299. See id. at 2.
300. See id. at 4-6.
301. See id. at 4-5.
302. Id. at 6.
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Canan's recommendations 1 and 4, allowing better future data col-
lection on SLAPP suits and immediate appeal of any order concern-
ing a special motion to strike.303 However, there still remain several
areas in which section 425.16's provision of protections may be defi-
cient to meet the statute's stated purpose. The consultants' recom-
mendations to the Judicial Council highlight some of these areas.
These areas are discussed more fully in the Appendix 3 analysis.
Key among them are: (1) the need to clarify that costs and attorney's
fees can be awarded for defending the entire action;30 4 (2) the need to
clarify that discovery is disfavored and to provide guidelines as to
when it would be appropriate to grant limited discovery;305 and (3)
the need to clarify that the statute does not apply to SLAPP-backs.30 6
Another suggestion of the consultants is to amend the statute to pro-
vide for additional sanctions, as appropriate, to enhance SLAPP suit
deterrence.3 °7
Other issues have arisen in the statute's interpretation and are
currently unresolved.30 8 Primary among those areas is the overall
breadth of the statute's applicability. The California legislature has
given section 425.16 much broader parameters than some other anti-
SLAPP provisions. 309 When a few appellate decisions attempted to
interpret section 425.16 consistently with the more usual breadth of
anti-SLAPP statutes, the legislature stepped in and amended the
act with the express intent of overruling those decisions. 1 One con-
sequence of California's having such a broad statute is that any
303. See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
304. See infra Appendix 3, notes 364-65 and accompanying text (discussing
Recommendation 2).
305. See infra Appendix 3, notes 377-87 and accompanying text (discussing
Recommendation 6).
306. See infra Appendix 3, notes 372-76 and accompanying text (discussing
Recommendation 5).
307. See infra Appendix 3, notes 388-95 and accompanying text (discussing
Recommendation 7).
308. The question of the federal courts' acceptance of section 425.16 in its
entirety for application to state law claims brought in federal court cannot be
controlled by the California legislature, but it is something to watch because of
the possibility of forum shopping. See supra Part MlI.G.
309. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
310. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text
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individual who alleges libel, invasion of privacy, or intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress against a newspaper, publishing, or
other media company can expect to be quickly served with a special
motion to strike, as the media defendant characterizes itself as a
SLAPPee.31' While initially such motions were filed in cases where
the media coverage was of petitioning activity,3 12 of late the motions
have come even when the coverage is of "ordinary" news.313 This
turn of events has been viewed by some as changing the law of libel
and defamation and has raised questions about whether that should
really be a purpose of section 425.16.314 Concerns have also arisen
over the statute's application in so-called private actions and private
disputes or other communications or acts that do not involve
311. See James E. Grossberg & Dee Lord, California's Anti-SLAPP Statute,
13 CoMM. LAw. 3 (1995) (noting that media attorneys believe the anti-SLAPP
statute is "an important defensive tool"); see also JUDICIAL COUNCIL SLAPP
REPORT, supra note 8, Attachment 8, at 2 (Letter from Michael Reedy to Judi-
cial Council of California (Jan. 23, 1998)) ("There is a reason that newspaper
publishers support Section 425.16 so vehemently, whether conservative or lib-
eral. They certainly have First Amendment concerns, but they also appreciate
the fact that this law makes it extremely difficult for anyone to win a defama-
tion case against them.").
312. See, e.g., Braun v. Chronicle Publ'g Co., 52 Cal. App. 4th 1036, 61 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 58 (Ct App. 1997) (defamation action for articles about state auditor
probe of the finances of a hospital research and training center at the Univer-
sity of California at San Francisco); Lafayette Morehouse, Inc. v. Chronicle
Publ'g Co., 37 Cal. App. 4th 855, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 46 (Ct App. 1995) (libel
lawsuit based on series of articles describing public hearings over activities of
nontraditional university).
313. See Rogers v. Home Shopping Network, Inc., 57 F. Supp. 2d 973 (C.D.
Cal. 1999) (libel lawsuit for article in National Enquirer); Marich v. QRZ Me-
dia, Inc., 73 Cal. App. 4th 299, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 406 (Ct App. 1999) (lawsuit
alleging invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
illegal eavesdropping for coverage on TV show, "LAPD: Life on the Beat" of
discovery of son's body after drug overdose and telephone notification to par-
ents of death).
314. A number of the attorneys who responded to the Judicial Council with
comments, particularly those representing the SLAPP filers, had concerns that
some broad appellate interpretations of section 425.16 were rewriting the law
of defamation and libel. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL SLAPP REPORT, supra note 8,
Attachment 8 (Letter from Michael Reedy to Judicial Council of California
(Jan. 23, 1998); Letter from Barbara Lawless to James Brighton (Jan. 13,
1998); Letter from William Simpich to James Brighton (Jan. 12, 1997 [sic]);
Letter from Thomas G. Kieviet to James Brighton (Jan. 15, 1998)).
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petitioning." 5 The answer to these questions about the breadth of
section 425.16 will lie in further interpretations of the scope of sec-
tion 425.16(e)(3) and (4), unless the legislature chooses to define
such terms as "public forum," "a place open to the public," and "an
issue of public interest.
3 1 6
VI. CONCLUSION
California's section 425.16 can provide full protection for the
ordinary citizen and others who participate in government petition-
ing. The provision also is designed to provide protection beyond the
traditional scope of an anti-SLAPP statute. The key questions about
the operation of section 425.16 are twofold. First, are the trial courts
handling special motions to strike in the spirit of the statute? Unfor-
tunately, because of the inadequacy of the Judicial Council's report
on SLAPPs to the legislature, it is uncertain whether trial courts are
interpreting the statute appropriately. Second, is the very broad
scope of section 425.16, especially since the 1997 amendments, the
best balance between the rights of speech and petition and the right
to sue and get redress for alleged wrongs? To accurately answer
those questions, the continued development of the law under section
425.16 should be tracked-and tracked more carefully than is evi-
dent from the Judicial Council's report.
315. See id., Attachment 8, at 2 (Letter from Kevin Anderson to James
Brighton (Jan. 13, 1998)); id., Attachment 8, at 1 (Letter from Thomas G.
Kieviet to James Brighton (Jan. 15, 1998)).
316. One author has made rather extensive suggestions for amending section





The full text of section 425.16 as of the 1999 amendments is as
follows:
(a) The Legislature finds and declares that there has been a
disturbing increase in lawsuits brought primarily to chill the
valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of
speech and petition for the redress of grievances. The Leg-
islature finds and declares that it is in the public interest to
encourage continued participation in matters of public sig-
nificance, and that this participation should not be chilled
through abuse of the judicial process. To this end, this sec-
tion shall be construed broadly.
(b)(1) A cause of action against a person arising from any
act of that person in furtherance of the person's right of
petition or free speech under the United States or Cali-
fornia Constitution in connection with a public issue
shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the
court determines that the plaintiff has established that
there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the
claim.
(2) In making its determination, the court shall consider
the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits
stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is
based.
(3) If the court determines that the plaintiff has estab-
lished a probability that he or she will prevail on the
claim, neither that determination nor the fact of that de-
termination shall be admissible in evidence at any later
stage of the case, and no burden of proof or degree of
proof otherwise applicable shall be affected by that de-
termination.
(c) In any action subject to subdivision (b), a prevailing de-
fendant on a special motion to strike shall be entitled to re-
cover his or her attorney's fees and costs. If the court finds
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that a special motion to strike is frivolous or is solely in-
tended to cause unnecessary delay, the court shall award
costs and reasonable attorney's fees to a plaintiff prevailing
on the motion, pursuant to Section 128.5.
(d) This section shall not apply to any enforcement action
brought in the name of the people of the State of California
by the Attorney General, district attorney, or city attorney,
acting as a public prosecutor.
(e) As used in this section, "act in furtherance of a person's
right of petition or free speech under the United States or
California Constitution in connection with a public issue"
includes: (1) any written or oral statement or writing made
before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or
any other official proceeding authorized by law; (2) any
written or oral statement or writing made in connection
with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative,
executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding
authorized by law; (3) any written or oral statement or
writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum
in connection with an issue of public interest; (4) or any
other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitu-
tional right of petition or the constitutional right of free
speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of pub-
lic interest.
(f) The special motion may be filed within 60 days of the
service of the complaint or, in the court's discretion, at any
later time upon terms it deems proper. The motion shall be
noticed for hearing not more than 30 days after service un-
less the docket conditions of the court require a later hear-
ing.
(g) All discovery proceedings in the action shall be stayed
upon the filing of a notice of motion made pursuant to this
section. The stay of discovery shall remain in effect until
notice of entry of the order ruling on the motion. The court,
on noticed motion and for good cause shown, may order
that specified discovery be conducted notwithstanding this
subdivision.
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(h) For purposes of this section, "complaint" includes
"cross-complaint" and "petition," "plaintiff' includes
"cross-complainant" and "petitioner," and "defendant" in-
cludes "cross-defendant" and "respondent."
(i) On or before January 1, 1998, the Judicial Council shall
report to the Legislature on the frequency and outcome of
special motions made pursuant to this section, and on any
other matters pertinent to the purposes of this section.
(j) An order granting or denying a special motion to strike
shall be appealable under Section 904.1.
(k)(1) Any party who files a special motion to strike pursuant to
this section, and any party who files an opposition to a special
motion to strike, shall, promptly upon so filing, transmit to
the Judicial Council, by e-mail or fax, a copy of the endorsed-
filed caption page of the motion or opposition, a copy of any
related notice of appeal or petition for a writ, and a con-
formed copy of any order issued pursuant to this section, in-
eluding any order granting or denying a special motion to
strike, discovery, or fees.
(2)The Judicial Council shall maintain a public record of in-
formation transmitted pursuant to this subdivision for at least
three years, and may store the information on microfilm or
other appropriate electronic media.
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APPENDIX 2
Summary of Circumstances Where
SLAPPee Has Met or Not Met
the Special Motion to Strike Burden of Proof
There have been thirty-one California appellate decisions on
special motions to strike under Section 425.16.317 In most of these
cases the SLAPPee ultimately received protection.318 This Appendix
provides a summary of some of the situations considered by the Cali-
fornia courts concerning the SLAPPee's burden of proof.
Examples of where the SLAPPee has met the burden of proof
include the following circumstances:
" acts and statements supporting and encouraging a lawsuit that
alleged improper contracting practices;
319
" suit over an allegedly libelous political campaign flyer that con-
cerned the quintessential subject of the constitutional right to free
speech;
320
" new litigation which is an attack on the judgment for a SLAPPee
in prior litigation;
32'
" private communications regarding a city's initial determination to
permit a home to be used as a battered women's shelter;
322
317. See infra Appendix 3, note 345 and accompanying text.
318. See supra notes 67-73 and accompanying text.
319. See Wilcox v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. App. 4th 809, 821-22, 33 Cal. Rptr.
2d 446,453-54 (Ct App. 1994).
320. See Matson v. Dvorak 40 Cal. App. 4th 539, 548, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 880,
885-86 (Ct App. 1995); see also Braun v. Chronicle Publ'g Co., 52 Cal. App.
4th 1036, 1042-43, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 58, 61 (Ct App. 1997) (allegedly libelous
accounts of improper management in university medical program contained in
a newspaper article are protected free speech "in connection with a public is-
sue"); Beilenson v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. App. 4th 944, 950, 52 Cal. RptLr. 2d
357, 361 (Ct App. 1996) (allegedly libelous statements made by political candi-
date against opponent in election are protected political speech).
321. See Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim, 42 Cal. App. 4th 628, 648, 49
Cal. Rptr. 2d 620, 632 (Ct App. 1996).
322. See Averill v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. App. 4th 1170, 1175-76, 50 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 62,65 (Ct App. 1996).
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" a public report issued by the district attorney questioning the
truthfulness of a deputy sheriffs search warrant affidavit and his
motives;
323
" a letter from a law firm to prospective clients indicating that the
firm intended to file a complaint with the state attorney general
regarding non-payment of royalties;
324
" newspaper articles reporting on various aspects of a governmen-
tal investigative audit, even if the auditor's powers did not extend
beyond investigatory powers;
325
" claims of an invasion of privacy for public disclosure of private
facts and the intentional infliction of emotional distress arising
out of a television show featuring a fire department's response in
a death investigation;
326
" a statement made by a union organizer during a major labor dis-
pute;
327
" a developer's encouragement of individuals to oppose a compet-
ing project before the city council;
328
" statements made in connection with a recall election or in a no-
tice of intention to circulate a petition for recall;
329
* comments made to a governmental agency during the statutory
public comment period;330 and
323. See Bradbury v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. App. 4th 1112, 1116, 57 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 207, 209, 212 (Ct App. 1996).
324. See Dove Audio, Inc. v. Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman, 47 Cal. App. 4th
777, 784, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 830, 834-35 (Ct App. 1996).
325. See Braun, 52 Cal. App. 4th at 1042-43, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 61; see also
Lafayette Morehouse, Inc. v. Chronicle Publ'g Co., 37 Cal. App. 4th 855, 862,
44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 46, 50 (Ct. App. 1995).
326. See Marich v. QRZ Media, Inc., 73 Cal. App. 4th 299, 316, 86 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 406, 418-19 (Ct. App. 1999).
327. See Monterey Plaza Hotel v. Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees
Local 483, 69 Cal. App. 4th 1057, 1063-64, 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 10, 14 (Ct. App.
1999).
328. See Ludwig v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. App. 4th 8, 14, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d
350, 355 (Ct App. 1995).
329. See Robertson v. Rodriguez, 36 Cal. App. 4th 347, 356, 42 Cal. Rptr.
2d 464, 468-69 (Ct. App. 1995) (recall election); Evans v. Unkow, 38 Cal.
App. 4th 1490, 1495, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 624, 627 (Ct. App. 1995) (notice of in-
tent to circulate recall petition).
330. See Dixon v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. App. 4th 733, 742-44, 36 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 687, 694-95 (Ct. App. 1994).
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claims of false statements made by a corporation in lobbying ac-
tivities directed toward governmental agencies and legislatures
and in advertising and marketing activities to the medical profes-
sion and the public.33 '
Instances where California courts have not found Section 425.16
applicable (and where they were not reversed or disapproved by
Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportuni9 32 ) include the fol-
lowing situations:
" a media company's planned mini-series on the life of an ac-
tress;
333
" a leaflet distribution by an anti-abortion protester that allegedly
contained inaccuracies;
334
" a challenge by a townhouse owner to an association assess-
ment;311 and
" a letter that induces a breach of contract even where contract
services will be performed before a reviewing government
agency.
336
331. See DuPont Merck Pharm. Co. v. Superior Court 78 Cal. App. 4th 562,
564, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 755, 757 (Ct. App. 2000).
332. 19 Cal. 4th 1106, 969 P.2d 564, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 471 (1999); see supra
note 100.
333. See Taylor v. National Broad. Co., No. BC110922, 1994 WL 762226, at
*7 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept 29, 1994). The denial of the motion to strike in Tay-
lor was based on the fact that it improperly sought to eliminate only those por-
tions of plaintiff's complaint seeking injunctive relief, as well as on its failure to
show facts that the complaint was "filed primarily to chill the valid exercise of
constitutional rights." Id.
334. See Family Planning Specialists Med. Group, Inc. v. Powers, 39 Cal.
App. 4th 1561, 1566, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 667, 669 (Ct App. 1995). The basis of
the denial of the motion to strike in Family Planning is unclear. The appellate
court noted that the trial court's ruling indicated a finding "either that respon-
dents' causes of action against [the movant] did not 'aris[e] from any act of
that person in furtherance of the person's right of petition or free speech,' or
that there was a 'probability that the [respondents would] prevail' on their
claims at trial." Id. at 1566, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 669.
335. See Foothills Townhome Ass'n v. Christiansen, 65 Cal. App. 4th 688,
696, 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 516, 520 (Ct App. 1998). In Foothills, the court ulti-
mately concluded that the movant had "failed to meet his burden to show the
lawsuit was brought to chill his first amendment rights." Id. at 696, 76 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 520.
336. See Los Cameros Community Assocs., v. Penfield & Smith Eng'rs,
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APPENDIX 3
Summary and Analysis of the Recommendations
Made by Consultants to the Judicial Council of California
Concerning Civil Procedure Code Section 425.16
As background to this summary and analysis of the recommen-
dations made to the Judicial Council concerning section 425.16 by
the consultants, George W. Pring and Penelope Canan, some under-
standing of the methodology used by the Judicial Council in collect-
ing data about section 425.16 and the consultants' analysis of that
data is appropriate.
As noted in the Article's text, the Judicial Council employed
various data collection methods. These include the following: (1)
review of 822 cases randomly selected from those general civil mat-
ters filed in 1995 in San Diego, Alameda, and Shasta counties to de-
termine the frequency of section 425.16 special motions to strike, (2)
contact with organizations that had supported or opposed the SLAPP
legislation to identify counsel involved in SLAPP litigation, (3) con-
tact with the identified attorneys to identify SLAPP cases those at-
torneys were aware of, (4) contact with named counsel in nineteen
appellate cases involving section 425.16 to secure their comments
about the statute, both as to effectiveness and need for change, and
(5) submission of all information compiled by steps (1) through (4)
to SLAPP experts Canan and Pring for their independent analysis
and comments. 337  The Judicial Council made the Canan-Pring
analysis part of its final report.33 8 The Canan-Pring analysis often
criticized the Judicial Council's data collection methodology, as is
detailed more fully below.
Inc., 65 Cal. App. 4th 168, 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 396, 401 (Ct App. 1998), review
granted and action deferred pending disposition ofBriggs v. Eden Council for
Hope & Opportunity, 966 P.2d 441, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 407 (1998), review dis-
missed and cause remanded, 970 P.2d 409, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 835 (1999); see
supra notes 177-95 and accompanying text.
337. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL SLAPP REPORT, supra note 8, at 1-4.
338. See id., Attacbment 2.
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The data collection efforts resulted in the following information:
- The review of the 822 random cases in the three counties
revealed no cases involving a section 425.16 special motion
to strike. According to this data, the Judicial Council con-
cluded that SLAPP strike motions "occur in 1.3 percent or
fewer of cases.
339
The Canan-Pring analysis noted that this method of at-
tempting to determine the frequency of special motions "was
doomed to failure" because court management systems are
not geared to provide this type of information absent a special
notice to the courts to create "a retrievable case identifier."
340
- The Judicial Council also contacted four organizations
mentioned in the statute's legislative history as supportive of
the legislation, and from them learned of fourteen attorneys
who had done SLAPP suit representation. The Judicial
Council contacted those attorneys and asked them to com-
plete a survey form for any cases they knew involving a sec-
tion 425.16 special motion to strike. The attorneys returned
forms describing twelve superior court cases. The courts
granted the motion to strike in six of these cases, denied the
motion in three, left one pending, and dropped the remaining
two from the calendar. Several of the cases apparently went
up on appeal?
41
While the Canan-Pring analysis indicated that this effort
to expand the Judicial Council's data collection base was ap-
propriate, the consultants felt the method was "seriously
flawed., 342 The consultants noted that there was both a much
339. Id. at3.
340. Id., Attachment 2, at 2.
341. See id. at 3 & Attachments 4 and 5. One of the twelve superior court
cases included was Sipple v. Foundation for Natl Progress. See 71 Cal. App.
4th 226, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 677 (Ct App. 1999).
By contrast, as of this Article's publication date, the Judicial Council had
already received filings from 74 cases in the first seven months it has been
keeping the log of section 425.16 special motion filings as mandated by the
1999 amendment. See SL4PP Special Motion Log, available at California
Courts: Reference: Courts-How to Use (last modified May 10, 2000)
<http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/reference/4_courtshowto.htrn#SLAPPs>.
342. JUDICIAL COUNCIL SLAPP REPORT, supra note 8, Attachment 2, at 4.
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larger coalition of supporters than the four contacted, as well
as a number of opponents to the legislation. Surveying the
newspaper coverage at the time of the efforts to pass the leg-
islation could have identified these larger numbers and pro-
vided a more balanced group to survey. 343 Additionally, the
consultants criticized the survey form for failing to provide
key data, such as the case name or the name of the person
submitting the form, and thus only limited information could
be gleaned from the responses.
- The Judicial Council sent letters to the sixty-five attor-
neys acting as counsel in nineteen appellate cases involving
section 425.16 motions to strike,345 asking their opinion about
343. See id., Attachment 2, at 3-4. The author's own research into press
coverage of SLAPP suits revealed over 250 articles, which often identified at-
torneys involved in cases where anti-SLAPP motions were filed or commen-
tators who had remarked upon those cases or the statute. See Search of
LEXIS, News Group File, All (search for records containing "SLAPP or
425.16 and California" and 1-1-93 to 9-30-99 in DATE field).
344. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL SLAPP REPORT, supra note 8, Attachment 2, at
4.
345. These 19 cases represent most of the section 425.16 appellate cases de-
cided in the first five years of the statute's operation (1993-97). See id., At-
tachment 2, at 13, n.ii. The 19 opinions actually represent only 18 separate
cases, as Lafayette Morehouse produced two appellate decisions. See 37 Cal.
App. 4th 855, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 46 (Ct App. 1995) (Lafayette Morehouse , af-
firming grant of section 425.16 motion to dismiss); 39 Cal. App. 4th 1379, 46
Cal. Rptr. 2d 542 (Ct App. 1995) (Lafayette Morehouse II, ruling on attorneys
fees). During the period of 1993-97, courts decided two additional section
425.16 appellate cases that the Judicial Council inexplicably omitted from the
list See Peters v. Saunders, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 690 (Ct App. 1996); Family
Planning Specialists Med. Group, Inc. v. Powers, 39 Cal. App. 4th 1561, 46
Cal. Rptr. 2d 667 (Ct App. 1995). From 1998 through January 2000, there
have been 11 new appellate cases (not including the Supreme Court's decision
inBriggs v. Eden Councilfor Hope & Opportunity, 19 Cal. 4th 1106, 969 P.2d
564, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 471 (1999)), an approximately 61% increase in less than
two years over the 18 cases counted by the Judicial Council. See DuPont
Merck Pharm. Co. v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. App. 4th 562, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d
755 (Ct. App. 2000); Marich v. QRZ Media, Inc., 73 Cal. App. 4th 299, 86
Cal. Rptr. 2d 406 (Ct App. 1999); Kyle v. Carmon, 71 Cal. App. 4th 901, 84
Cal. Rptr. 2d 303 (Ct App. 1999); Sipple v. Foundation for Nat'l Progress, 71
Cal. App. 4th 226, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 677 (Ct App. 1999); Conroy v. Spitzer, 70
Cal. App. 4th 1446, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 443 (Ct App. 1999); Monterey Plaza Ho-
tel v. Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees Local 483, 69 Cal. App. 4th
1057, 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 10 (Ct App. 1999); Liu v. Moore, 69 Cal. App. 4th 745,
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the effectiveness of the statute and soliciting any suggestions
for improving the statute's efficacy. The Council received
sixteen written responses.
346
The consultants made a detailed analysis of the sixteen
responses347 and were pleased that the sixteen returns
were split fairly evenly among counsel for SLAPPers and
SLAPPees. 34' However, the Canan-Pring analysis also noted
certain weaknesses with this information: (1) the sample was
neither scientifically nor statistically valid, partly because
limiting the survey to appeals created a bias toward parties
who were more likely to have resources; and (2) the response
rate of sixteen out of sixty-five attorneys was low.
349
Based on what they viewed as "especially meritorious" sugges-
tions in those sixteen responses, Canan and Pring made a series of
six recommendations for amendments to section 425.16 to enhance
the statute's protections.3 50  A seventh recommendation (actually
81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 807 (Ct App. 1999); Coltrain v. Shewalter, 66 Cal. App. 4th
94, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 600 (Ct App. 1998); Mission Oaks Ranch, Ltd. v. County
of Santa Barbara, 65 Cal. App. 4th 713, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1 (Ct App. 1998),
disapproved by Briggs, 19 Cal. 4th 1106, 969 P.2d 564, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 471;
Foothills Townhome Ass'n v. Christiansen, 65 Cal. App. 4th 688, 76 Cal. Rptr.
2d 516 (Ct App. 1998); Los Cameros Community Assocs. v. Penfield & Smith
Eng'rs, Inc., 65 Cal. App. 4th 168, 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 396 (Ct App. 1998), re-
view granted and action deferred pending disposition of Briggs, 966 P.2d 441,
79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 407 (1998), review dismissed and cause remanded, 970 P.2d
409, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 835 (1999) (pursuant to settlement notice and request for
dismissal by parties). An additional 1999 opinion, Ingram v. Flippo, 74 Cal.
App. 4th 1280, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 60 (Ct App. 1999), notes that the defendants
had filed a demurrer and a special motion to strike under section 425.16, but
the trial court's granting of the demurrer without leave to amend was the only
issue on appeal. See id. at 63-64. Therefore, the case has not been counted as
one dealing with the anti-SLAPP statute.
346. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL SLAPP REPORT, supra note 8, at 3-4 & Attach-
ments 6-8.
347. See id., Attachment 2, at 4-11.
348. See id., Attachment 2, at 4. Of particular interest is the fact that both the
attorneys for filers of SLAPPs and for SLAPP targets rated the statute effective,
although many of the attorneys for SLAPP filers "qualified [their] approval by
pointing out 'difficulties' or 'abuses'," often in their own cases. Id., Attachment
2, at 5-6.
349. See id., Attachment 2, at 4.
350. See id., Attachment 2, at 11-12. Despite their criticism of this aspect of
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Recommendation 1) was related to enhancing the ability of the Judi-
cial Council to do valid future research on cases where Section
425.16 is applicable.35' The consultants' recommendations35 2 and
the Judicial Council's reactions3 53 to those recommendations are
quoted below. The author's comments follow those recommenda-
tions and reactions.
Recommendation 1. If the legislature requires knowing how the
anti-SLAPP provision is working, it must enable reliable re-
search. At a minimum it should require the filing of a simple
form whenever the motion is entered. Then a random sample of
these could be selected and various participants interviewed
about impacts.
Judicial Council's View. The Judicial Council does not be-
lieve that further data collection on special anti-SLAPP
motions by the courts is necessary. The information al-
ready obtained by staff is adequate to indicate that special
anti-SLAPP motions are not very common. Most survey
respondents believed the existence of the statute deters
SLAPP suits as the Legislature intended. A case-level re-
view is required to collect data on special anti-SLAPP mo-
tions. Further tracking of section 425.16 would be burden-
some and costly and should not be required.
Author's Comments. The 1999 amendment to section
425.16 adopted Recommendation 1. New subsection
(k) requires any party filing or opposing a special
motion to strike to submit to the Judicial Council a
copy of the motion or opposition cover page, as well as
any order and any notice of appeal.3 54 The Judicial
the survey methodology, see supra Appendix 3, text accompanying note 349,
Canan and Pring found that the 16 responses provided "a wealth of useful in-
formation." JUDICIAL COUNCIL SLAPP REPORT, supra note 8, Attachment 2,
at 5.
351. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL SLAPP REPORT, supra note 8, Attachment 2, at
11-12.
352. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL SLAPP REPORT, supra note 8, at 4-6.
353. See id.
354. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(k)(1) (West Supp. 2000):
Any party who files a special motion to strike pursuant to this section,
and any party who files an opposition to a special motion to strike,
shall, promptly upon so filing, transmit to the Judicial Council, by e-
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Council is to maintain these records for at least 3
years.355
The legislature thereby overruled the Judicial
Council's conclusion that no further data collection is
needed. Indeed, the Judicial Council's self-satisfaction
with its data collection efforts seems surprising, given
that the consultants it hired characterized its meth-
ods as "flawed., 356  One can only wonder why the
mail or fax, a copy of the endorsed-filed caption page of the motion or
opposition, a copy of any related notice of appeal or petition for a writ,
and a conformed copy of any order issued pursuant to this section, in-
cluding any order granting or denying a special motion to strike, dis-
covery, or fees.
Id.
355. See id. § 425.16(k)(2) ("The Judicial Council shall maintain a public rec-
ord of informtion transmitted pursuant to this subdivision for at least three years,
and may store the information on microfilm or other appropriate electronic me-
dia.").
356. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL SLAPP REPORT, supra note 8, Attachment 2, at
4. Another possible manner in which the data collection was flawed was by
the selection of counties from which cases were randomly surveyed. The Judi-
cial Council indicated that San Diego, Alameda, and Shasta Counties were
chosen "to provide a realistic sample of geographic locations and populations,"
as well as because of their volume of cases and court automation. Id. at 2. The
Canan-Pring analysis noted that given their anecdotal knowledge that scores of
SLAPPs and special motions to strike had been filed since section 425.16's ef-
fective date, see PRING & CANAN, supra note 29, at 198; Michael Gougis,
SLAPPed with a Lawsuit?, SAN GABRIEL VALLEY TRIB., May 3, 1995, at Al,
"[t]hese three jurisdictions may not be representative of all counties in Califor-
nia . . . in which anti-SLAPP statutes [sic] have been filed." JUDICIAL
COUNCIL SLAPP REPORT, supra note 8, Attachment 2, at 3. Canan and
Pring's expertise suggested that "SLAPPs were more likely in counties with
high proportions of white urban dwellers and where quality of life, growth, and
pressures for land development were at the center of local conflicts." Id. They
recommended that the Judicial Council consider community characteristics and
controversies in the future. See id.
This author made a simple analysis of the geographical source of the 31
appellate SLAPP cases decided to date. The analysis showed the following:
(1) eight cases were from the First District Court of Appeal; of those, five had
been filed in San Francisco County Superior Court: Braun v. Chronicle Publ'g
Co., 52 Cal. App. 4th 1036, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 58 (Ct. App. 1997); Ericsson GE
Mobile Communications, Inc. v. C.S.I. Telecomms. Eng'rs, 49 Cal. App. 4th
1591, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 491 (Ct App. 1996), disapproved by Briggs, 19 Cal. 4th
1106, 969 P.2d 564, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 471; Linsco/Private Ledger, Inc. v. In-
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vestors Arbitration Servs., Inc., 50 Cal. App. 4th 1633, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 613
(Ct App. 1996), disapproved by Briggs, 19 Cal. 4th 1106, 969 P.2d 564, 81
Cal. Rptr 2d 471; Zhao v. Wong, 48 Cal. App. 4th 1114, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 909
(Ct App. 1996), disapproved by Briggs, 19 Cal. 4th 1106, 969 P.2d 564, 81
Cal. Rptr 2d 471; Lafayette Morehouse 1, 37 Cal. App. 4th 855, 44 Cal Rptr. 2d
46; two had been filed in Alameda County Superior Court: Briggs, 19 Cal. 4th
1106, 969 P.2d 564, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 471; Family Planning Specialists, 39 Cal.
App. 4th 1561, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 667; and one in San Mateo County Superior
Court: Evans v. Unkow, 38 Cal. App. 4th 1490, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 624 (Ct. App.
1995); (2) thirteen cases were from the Second District, and of those, eight had
been filed in Los Angeles County Superior Court: Marich, 73 Cal. App. 4th
299, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 406; Sipple, 71 Cal. App. 4th 226, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 677;
Liu, 69 Cal. App. 4th 745, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 807; Dove Audio, Inc. v. Rosen-
feld, Meyer & Susman, 47 Cal. App. 4th 777, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 830 (Ct App.
1996); Saunders, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 690; Church of Scientology, 42 Cal. App.
4th 628, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 620; Robertson v. Rodriguez, 36 Cal. App. 4th 347,
42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 464 (Ct App. 1995); Wilcox v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. App.
4th 809, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 446 (Ct App. 1994); three in Ventura County Supe-
rior Court: Macias v. Hartwell, 55 Cal. App. 4th 669, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 222 (Ct
App. 1997); Bradbury v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. App. 4th 1108, 57 Cal. Rptr.
2d 207 (Ct App. 1996); Beilenson v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. App. 4th 944, 52
Cal. Rptr. 2d 357 (Ct App. 1996); and two in Santa Barbara County Superior
Court: Los Carneros, 65 Cal. App. 4th 168, 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 396, review
granted and action deferred pending disposition of Briggs, 966 P.2d 441, 79
Cal. Rptr. 2d 407 (1998), review dismissed and cause remanded, 970 P.2d 409,
81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 835 (1999); Mission Oaks Ranch, 65 Cal. App. 4th 713, 77
Cal. Rptr. 2d 1, disapproved by Briggs, 19 Cal. 4th 1106, 969 P.2d 564, 81
Cal. Rptr 2d 471, (3) two cases were from the Third District and, of those, one
had been filed in Glenn County Superior Court: Kyle v. Carmon, 71 Cal. App.
4th 901, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 303 (Ct App. 1999); the other was brought in Nevada
County Superior Court, Matson v. Dvorak, 40 Cal. App. 4th 539, 46 Cal. Rptr.
2d 880 (Ct App. 1995), (4) seven cases were from the Fourth District and of
those, five had been filed in Orange County Superior Court: DuPont Merck
Pharm. Co. v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. App. 4th 562, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 755 (Ct
App. 2000); Conroy, 70 Cal. App. 4th 1446, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 443; Foothills
Townhome Ass'n, 65 Cal. App. 4th 688, 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 516; Averill v. Supe-
rior Court, 42 Cal. App. 4th 1170, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 62 (Ct App. 1996); Dixon
v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. App. 4th 733, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 687 (Ct App. 1994),
and two in Riverside County Superior Court: Coltrain, 66 Cal. App. 4th 94, 77
Cal. Rptr. 2d 600; Ludwig v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. App. 4th 8, 43 Cal. Rptr.
2d 350 (Ct App. 1995), (5) none of the reported cases were from the Fifth
District, and (6) one case was from the Sixth District having been filed in
Monterey County Superior Court: Monterey Plaza Hotel, 69 Cal. App. 4th
1057, 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 10. This simple analysis reveals that of the three coun-
ties chosen by the Judicial Council, none of the appellate SLAPP cases were
originally filed in either Shasta or San Diego Counties, and only two of the
cases were filed in Alameda County. Moreover, 58% of the 31 cases were
filed in Los Angeles, Orange, or San Francisco Counties--areas that might
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consultants were not hired at the beginning of the proc-
ess so that their expertise could have been utilized in
the data collection process.
357
Based on its data (qualitative and quantitative), the
Judicial Council concluded that "special anti-SLAPP
motions are not very common." '358 Since the Judicial
Council's conclusion rested on flawed data, it is un-
certain whether this conclusion is true. In this regard,
it must be emphasized that the consultants noted that
"the finding that there were no motions to strike in the
three selected jurisdictions does not prove or disprove
the effectiveness of 425.16 'to prevent or eliminate
SLAPPs."'35 9 In addition, there have been eleven new
appellate cases in the short interval since the Judicial
Council finished its data collection.360 Since most
cases are not appealed and are therefore unreported,
this surge of reported appellate cases must be viewed
more aptly fit the Canan-Pring criteria than the three chosen. It is also inter-
esting that nearly 58% of the 74 new SLAPP case filings reported to the Judi-
cial Council since November 1999 were also from Los Angeles, Orange, and
San Francisco Counties. See SLAPP Special Motion Log, available at Califor-
nia Courts: Reference: Courts-How to Use (last modified May 10, 2000)
<http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/reference/4_.courtshowto.htn#SLAPPs>.
357. Canan and Pring note that they had earlier learned for themselves that
the random case sample approach used by the Judicial Council was not pro-
ductive. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL SLAPP REPORT, supra note 8, Attachment 2,
at 2-3; supra Appendix 3, note 356 (discussing Canan and Pring's expertise
concerning the likely location of SLAPP lawsuits).
358. JUDICIAL COUNCIL SLAPP REPORT, supra note 8, Attachment 1, at 6.
The Judicial Council also made some mathematical conclusions concerning the
SLAPP case data it collected.
None of the 822 cases examined in Alameda, San Diego, and Shasta
Counties was found to involve a special motion to strike a SLAPP.
Based on the total number of cases filed, these data suggest that spe-
cial motions to strike SLAPPs occur in 1.3 percent or fewer of cases.
Had these motions been more frequent, [Administrative Office of the
Courts] staff would have had a 95% chance of discovering at least
one.
Id. at 2. The Canan-Pring analysis suggested this conclusion had a variance
factor of"(p<.05)." Id., Attachment 2, at 2.
359. Id., Attachment 2, at 3.
360. See supra Appendix 3, note 345.
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as "the tip of the iceberg. 3 6' Thus, it may well be
likely that SLAPP cases and their need for the protec-
tions of the anti-SLAPP statute are much more com-
mon than the Judicial Council's imperfect data suggest.
Hopefully, the enhanced ability to collect data since
October 1999 will give a better overall picture of the
statute's use. A weakness of the statute's amendment,
however, is the almost voluntary nature of the data-
filing feature.362 Given the reluctance of the Judicial
Council to be involved in future data collection and the
likelihood of budget constraints, one cannot assume
that the Council will make much effort to ensure there
is compliance with the statute.363
Recommendation 2. Amend the statute to extend attorney fees
to cover the full costs that filers have imposed on targets. Add
"reasonably incurred in defending against the action" to the end
of the first sentence of 425.16(c).
Judicial Council's View. As drafted, section 425.16 is un-
clear as to whether mandatory fees apply only to costs asso-
ciated with the motion or costs associated with the entire
action. The Legislature's clarification of this point would
be helpful. Beyond this, the council does not endorse the
consultants' specific proposed amendment and takes no po-
sition on the substantive issue of the appropriate extent of
attorney fees.
Author's Comments. Since one appellate court has
concluded that an award of attorney's fees and costs
361. JUDICIAL COUNCIL SLAPP REPORT, supra note 8, Attachment 2, at 4;
see also supra Appendix 3, text accompanying note 349 (commenting on other
weaknesses in the focus on the 19 appellate decisions between 1993 and 1997).
362. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
363. See E-mail from Jacquelyn Harbert; Judicial Council, Administrative
Office of the Courts, Research and Planning Unit, to author (Jan. 4, 2000) (on
file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review) (noting that the Administra-
tive Office of the Courts was "working internally on additional approaches
[beyond the information on the California courts' Web site] to publicizing this
reporting requirement with administrative personnel in the trial courts"); see
also supra note 47 and accompanying text (regarding the non-obviousness of
the instructions for transmitting the required documents to the Judicial Council
on the California courts' Web site).
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pursuant to section 425.16 is limited to only those as-
sociated with the special motion to strike,364 some trial
courts have refused to make awards that encompass the
full costs imposed on the SLAPPee before the order
granting the motion to strike is made.365 To clarify the
statute's ambiguity on this point and to fulfill the stat-
ute's legislative purpose, there should be an amend-
ment allowing full recovery of both costs and attor-
ney's fees incurred in defending against the SLAPP
action.
Recommendation 3. Amend the statute to control the judge's
discretion regarding the motion-filing deadline. Add "whenever
necessary or desirable to carry out the legislative intent in sub-
section (a)" to 425.16(f).
Judicial Council's View. The council believes that the leg-
islative action recommended by the consultant[s] is not
necessary because the statute already provides the court
with sufficient discretion to extend the motion-filing dead-
lines.
Author's Comments. The issue of the filing deadline
for the special motion to strike has not seemed to be
a problem in the reported cases. Indeed, noting the
provision of section 425.16(a) that the statute be inter-
preted broadly, one court has construed the statute
to permit the filing of a motion to strike within sixty
days from the filing of challenged amended counter-
claims.366 However, the Judicial Council's report
364. See Lafayette Morehouse II, 39 Cal. App. 4th at 1383-84, 46 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 544; see also supra notes 232-33 and accompanying text.
365. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL SLAPP REPORT, supra note 8, Attachment 2, at
8 (discussing the consultants' concern about a "developing 'judicial gloss,"'
which was limiting fee awards only to attorneys' work on the special motion to
strike); see also Telephone Interview with Mark Goldowitz, Director of Cali-
fornia Anti-SLAPP Project and sole practitioner specializing in section 425.16
defense (Jan. 4, 2000) (observing that not every court was granting discovery
costs and attorney's fees associated with discovery).
366. See Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Computer Group, Inc., 63 F.
Supp. 2d 1127, 1129 (N.D. Cal. 1999). But see DuPont Merck, 78 Cal. App.
4th at 565, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 758 (appellate court initially denied writ of
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provided no clear picture of what is happening at the
trial court level, and one cannot assume that there is
no problem simply because the appellate decisions
have not raised the issue. The consultants noted that
SLAPPees and their counsel can take months "to iden-
tify their case as a SLAPP. 367 While they acknowl-
edged that trial court judges are given discretion to ex-
tend the motion filing deadline, they believed it wise to
have "language to guide the trial courts in their exer-
cise of this discretion.., so that abusive denials do not
become a problem. ' 368 While Recommendation 3 may
not be as critical as some others, it would be appropri-
ate to amend the statute as suggested.
Recommendation 4. Amend the statute or the list of appealable
orders in the Code of Civil Procedure to permit an immediate
appeal of the denial of an anti-SLAPP motion.
Judicial Council's View. The council believes that the
amendment proposed by the consultants is unnecessary be-
cause review by writ of mandate, which is currently avail-
able, is sufficient.
Author's Comments. The 1999 amendment to section
425.16 adopted Recommendation 4. New subsection
() provides that any ruling granting or denying a spe-
cial motion to strike is appealable.369
While there have been numerous appeals, the un-
successful movant (SLAPPee) had no right of appeal
prior to the 1999 amendment if the motion was denied.
The SLAPPee could petition for a writ of mandate but
those were rarely granted.370 The SLAPPer, however,
mandamus because the trial court record "failed to demonstrate permission was
sought or obtained" to file the special motion to strike after 60 days from
service of the complaint).
367. JUDICIAL COUNCIL SLAPP REPORT, supra note 8, Attachment 2, at 9.
368. Id.; see also supra note 49.
369. See CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 425.160) ("An order granting or denying a
special motion to strike shall be appealable under section 904.1.").
370. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text A recent example of a
SLAPP case in which a writ of mandate was denied is DuPont Merck Pharm.
Co. v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. App. 4th 562, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 755 (Ct. App.
2000). DuPont Merck filed a special motion to dismiss a consumer fraud case
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could appeal if the motion was granted and the com-
plaint was dismissed.3 7' The amendment advances the
purpose of the statute by protecting the SLAPPee from
having to incur defense costs of a full-blown trial until
the issue of First Amendment rights is resolved.
Recommendation 5. Amend the statute by adding a sentence to
425.16(d) to clarify that the special motion to strike does not ap-
ply to so-called SLAPPbacks 372 1 Possible language might be:
"This section shall not apply to any cause of action arising from
any cause of action which has been dismissed pursuant to a spe-
cial motion to strike under this section."
Judicial Council's View. The council believes that the
amendment proposed by the consultant[s] is unnecessary
because the judge hearing the SLAPPback case can deter-
mine whether the special motion is meritorious or not.
against the company on the grounds that it was merely exercising its petition
and speech rights when it attempted to convince legislators, doctors, and insur-
ance companies not to prescribe a generic version of the blood thinner Couma-
din on the basis that it was dangerous. See CA Supreme Court Grants Review
in Suit Over Warfarin Generic, 6 ANDREWs ANTITRUST LITIG. REP. 9 (Dec.
1998). The trial court agreed with the plaintiffs that section 425.16 did not ap-
ply because the company was only protecting its own interests, not a public
interest. See id. DuPont Merck then sought a writ of mandate from the appel-
late court but its petition was denied. See id. Fortunately for the company,
when it petitioned the California Supreme Court for review, that court directed
the court of appeal to vacate its order denying mandate and hear the matter.
See DuPont Merck Pharm. Co. v. Superior Court, No. S073419, 1999 Cal.
LEXIS 1815 (Cal. Mar. 31, 1999). When the court of appeal considered the
matter on the merits, it found that the trial court was wrong in concluding there
was not a public issue. See DuPont Merck, 78 Cal. App. 4th at 566-67, 92 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 759; supra note 136. The court of appeal therefore remanded the
case for consideration of "whether there was a probability plainiffs would pre-
vail." DuPont Merck, 78 Cal. App. 4th at 568, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 760.
371. See, e.g., Monterey Plaza Hotel, 69 Cal. App. 4th 1057, 82 Cal. Rptr.
2d 10; Macias, 55 Cal. App. 4th 669, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 222.
372. "SLAPP-backs are separate countersuits or counterclaims to SLAPPs,
usually for abuse of process or malicious prosecution, by SLAPP defendants."
Barker, supra note 11, at 431. An example of a SLAPPback is Leonardini v.
Shell Oil Co., 216 Cal. App. 3d 547, 555, 264 Cal. Rptr. 883, 886 (Ct. App.
1989), wherein the court ordered Shell Oil to pay the plaintiff a verdict of $5.2
million after it sued for trade libel a consumer advocate who had complained to
a state health agency about a Shell product used in home plumbing.
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Author's Comments. The existence of section 425.16,
permitting a SLAPPee to have a speedier remedy,
would seem to obviate the need for bringing a SLAPP-
back case.3 73 However, currently the anti-SLAPP stat-
ute only provides a limited remedy-dismissal of the
case and attorney's fees and costs for possibly only the
special motion to strike. No remedy is provided for
other damages, such as the extreme emotional distress
that can be caused to the individual SLAPPee374 or the
loss of time from other endeavors. But recovery of
such damages might be secured through a SLAPP-back
suit against the SLAPPer.
3 75
The problem is that if a prevailing SLAPPee files
a SLAPP-back suit, the SLAPP-back defendant could
file a special motion to strike under section 425.16.
This would be possible because under the terms of sub-
section (e)(1), the basis of the suit against the SLAPP-
back defendant would be "any written or oral statement
or writing made before a... judicial proceeding ' 376-
in other words, for the SLAPPer's acts in the underly-
ing SLAPP case that has been dismissed. While the
Judicial Council is right---"the judge hearing the
SLAPP-back case can determine whether the special
motion is meritorious or not"--the SLAPP-back plain-
tiff should not have to suffer such further harassment
and its attendant costs, financial and otherwise. Since
the SLAPP-back defendant would have already been
identified by the court as a SLAPPer in the underlying
373. See Lucas v. Swanson & Dowdall, 53 Cal. App. 4th 98, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d
507 (Ct App. 1997) (noting in a malicious prosecution case brought by a
SLAPPee who had been sued for libel and economic interference before the
enactment of section 425.16 that if plaintiff had been able to use the anti-
SLAPP statute, he likely would not have felt the need to bring the instant ac-
tion).
374. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text
375. See Garrison v. Baker, No. 98-17038, 2000 WL 206575 (9th Cir. Feb.
23, 2000) (finding that section 425.16 SLAPPee timely filed malicious prose-
cution action against SLAPPer).
376. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(e)(1) (West Supp. 2000).
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SLAPP case, he or she does not need protection from
the statute. The statute should be amended as recom-
mended by the consultants.
Recommendation 6. Amend the statute to control trial court
lifting of the "stay" of all discovery proceedings upon the filing
of the notice of the 425.16 motion. We would recommend an
amendment deleting the last sentence of subsection (g) and in-
serting: "Discovery shall be disfavored. In permitting any dis-
covery, the court shall limit it both as to means and subject to
only that which is necessary and designed to uncover evidence
directly relevant to the special motion to strike, most expedi-
tiously and at least expense to the party from whom discovery is
sought. To this end the court shall consider the following fac-
tors before permitting discovery: (1) whether the information
sought goes to the hear to [sic377] the claim or defense of the
party seeking discovery; (2) whether the party seeking discovery
has made a showing on every other element of the claim or de-
fense before any discovery is conducted; (3) what efforts the
party seeking discovery has made to secure the information prior
to filing the action; (4) whether the information is uniquely held
by the party from whom discovery is sought; and (5) whether
the party seeking discovery has exhausted all other sources of
obtaining the needed information."
Judicial Council's View. The council believes that the stat-
ute currently provides sufficient discretion for judges to
permit discovery after the filing of a special motion. There-
fore, the consultants' proposed amendment relating to the
"stay" of discovery upon the filing of a section 425.16 mo-
tion is not necessary.
Author's Comments. The consultants made this rec-
ommendation based on their overall research on
377. The original phrasing ("goes to the hear to the claim or defense") is un-
clear. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL SLAPP REPORT, supra note 8, Attachment 2, at
12. The Judicial Council interpreted it as "goes to the hear[ing] to the claim or
defense", see id. at 5-6, but this too is awkward at best and still somewhat un-
clear. This author, knowing her own typing foibles, suggests that Canan and
Pring may have meant "goes to the heart of the claim or defense."
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SLAPPs in which they found that "next to the filing of
the SLAPP itself, 'discovery' is the most effective
chilling abuse [SLAPPers] have., 378 The recommen-
dation seems to be a reaction to the comments of three
SLAPPer attorneys who expressed objections to the
strictures of section 425.16(g)'s stay of all discovery
proceedings.379 In response to these comments the
consultants expressed the view that section 425.16(g)
"is already too liberal in allowing the court 'for good
cause' (with no guidelines) to lift the stay and allow
filers to proceed with discovery before the motion is
ruled on.
3 °80
An examination of California appellate court rul-
ings concerning discovery seems to suggest that the
consultants' worries may be overblown. Where these
reported opinions have expressly considered discovery,
none has been allowed under section 425.16.381 The
appellate courts have also been strict about requiring
section 425.16(g)'s procedures be followed and have
refused to consider any discovery absent a noticed mo-
tion which specifies what and why discovery is
needed. 82 Even when there has been a proper notice,
the appellate courts have still scrutinized the request
carefully with an eye to the purposes of section
425.16.383
378. Id., Attachment 2, at 10; see also PRING & CANAN, supra note 29, at 37
(discussing discovery abuse in a SLAPP suit filed in California before the en-
actment of section 425.16).
379. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL SLAPP REPORT, supra note 8, Attachment 2, at
10.
380. Id.
381. See generally supra Part lII.D. But see Rogers v. Home Shopping
Network, Inc., 57 F. Supp. 2d 973, 985 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (allowing discovery
before hearing a special motion to strike in federal district court).
382. The fact that the California appellate courts have strictly applied section
425.16(g) seemed influential on a federal court's finding that the anti-SLAPP
provision collided with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8, 12 and 56. See
Rogers, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 978, 982.
383. See Sipple v. Foundation for Nat'l Progress, 71 Cal. App. 4th 226, 247,
83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 677, 690 (Ct App. 1999) (affirming the trial court's denial of
Ax0ril. 2000]
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However, in the responses to the Judicial Coun-
cil's survey of attorneys involved in the nineteen
SLAPP appellate cases, there is one anecdotal report
about a trial court allowing a SLAPPer to engage in
discovery which increased the SLAPPee's defense
costs substantially.384 Also, the trial court in Briggs v.
Eden Council of Hope and Opportunit95 allowed
major discovery-twelve depositions-although this
fact only comes out as part of the discussion of attor-
ney's fees and costs award in the unpublished decision
on remand following the supreme court opinion. 386 It
is thus very likely that the trial courts are allowing dis-
covery more regularly than it appears from a perusal of
the appellate decisions, 387 although this cannot be
known for certain because of the flawed database re-
lied on by the Judicial Council. If the California trial
courts are permitting discovery without regard to the
appellate precedents, guidelines such as those sug-
gested by the consultants would be appropriate.
Recommendation 7. Amend the statute to add new remedies.
We recommend the language in our "model bill" section
(5)(g)(2): "such additional sanctions upon the responding party
discovery where plaintiff sought iar-ranging discovery which would not result
in information that would allow plaintiff to meet its burden of proof).
384. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL SLAPP REPORT, supra note 8, Attachment 8
(Letter from Tony J. Tanke to James Brighton (Jan. 28, 1998)). The suit in
which the discovery was allowed was also the second SLAPP action brought
by the plaintiff in related matters. The SLAPPee did eventually prevail in the
appellate court, but the plaintiff avoided paying attorney's fees and costs in
both suits by filing bankruptcy. See id.; infra Appendix 3, notes 390-92 and
accompanying text.
385. Briggs 1, No. A072446 & A074357, slip op. (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 19,
1999).
386. See id. at 14; supra note 234; see also Ericsson GE Mobile Communi-
cations, Inc. v. C.S.I. Telecomms. Eng'rs, 49 Cal. App. 4th 1591, 1597, 57 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 491, 494 (Ct. App. 1996) (permitting limited discovery in trial court),
disapproved on other grounds by Briggs v. Eden Council of Hope and Oppor-
tunity, 19 Cal. 4th 1106, 969 P.2d 564, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d471 (1999).
387. As to the possibility that discovery is being allowed more frequently
than the appellate decisions suggest, consider infra, Appendix 3, note 399.
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[plaintiff filer], its attorneys, or law firms as it determines will
be sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct and comparable
conduct by others similarly situated.P3551
Judicial Council's View. The council does not endorse the
consultants' specific proposed amendment and takes no po-
sition on the substantive legal issue of whether additional
sanctions should be authorized.
Author's Comments. The consultants believe that the
availability of sanctions against both the SLAPP filer
and his or her attorney, in addition to attorney's fees
and costs for the successful SLAPPee, can act as a de-
terrent to future SLAPPs. 389 The consultants may have
been influenced to make this specific recommendation
to the Judicial Council because of a situation related as
one response of the surveyed attorneys in the nineteen
SLAPP appellate cases. This responding attorney rep-
resented the SLAPPee in Evans v. Unkow390 and also
represented a different SLAPPee in a related case
brought by the Evans v. Unkow SLAPPer.391 The de-
fendant-SLAPPees in both cases prevailed in the court
of appeal, yet the SLAPPer avoided paying attorney
fees and costs by filing bankruptcy. SLAPPee's coun-
sel was also unsuccessful in a motion for sanctions
in the second SUit. 392  Not surprisingly the attorney
388. The model bill referred to in Recommendation 7 can be found in PRING
& CANAN. See PRING & CANAN, supra note 29, at 201-05. Delaware's law is
an example of a statute that permits additional remedies. See 10 DEL. CODE
ANN. § 8138(a) (1999) (permitting compensatory damages and even punitive
damages in certain situations).
389. See PRING & CANN, supra note 29, at 205.
390. 38 Cal. App. 4th 1490,45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 624 (Ct App. 1995).
391. In Unkow, the SLAPPer, an East Palo Alto Sanitary District Board
member, sued Mr. Unkow and nine others who had signed and circulated a re-
call petition. See id. at 1493-94, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 626. In the second suit,
the same SLAPPer sued another member of the Sanitary District Board,
claiming he was the instigator of the recall campaign and drafter of the recall
petition. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL SLAPP REPORT, supra note 8, Attachment 8
(Letter from Tony J. Tanke to James Brighton (Jan. 28, 1998)).
392. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL SLAPP REPORT, supra note 8, Attachment 8
(Letter from Tony J. Tanke to James Brighton (Jan. 28, 1998)). Attorney's
A pril 20001
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responding to the Judicial Council's survey suggested
that "the SLAPP Suit Statute be amended to provide
remedies similar to those in the vexatious litigation
statute, i.e., court orders barring further suits, requiring
the posting of bonds, etc."
While one might hope that such an incident is rare,
it does reveal a significant loophole in the deterrence
aspects of the anti-SLAPP statute. "If a plaintiff has
economic resources, he or she will presumably respond
to the mandatory attorney fee provision by refraining
from SLAPP suit litigation." 393 But if a person is im-
mune from economic sanctions, he or she can abuse
the judicial system with impunity absent some other
sanction form. While one might argue that there are
existing vexatious litigation statutes that would be
available in egregious cases such as the anecdote,3 94
providing within the statute itself that a court has the
discretion to impose any other necessary sanctions will
better alert the courts, the parties and their attorneys to
that possibility.
395
This discussion has provided an overview of the report the Judi-
cial Council prepared for the legislature on SLAPPs. As this
author's comments emphasize, the biggest drawback of this report is
fees in the first case were $35,000 and in the second case, $75,000. The de-
fense of the second case was more costly because the trial court permitted the
SLAPPer to engage in discovery. See id.; see also supra Appendix 3, note 384
and accompanying text
393. JUDICLAL COUNCIL SLAPP REPORT, supra note 8, Attachment 8 (Letter
from Tony J. Tanke to James Brighton (Jan. 28, 1998)).
394. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.5 (West Supp. 2000) (permitting a
trial court to order a party to pay opponent's expenses where there have been
bad faith actions or tactics); id. § 128.7 (providing for monetary sanctions for
unwarranted or harassing pleadings).
395. Other authors have agreed that additional remedies are appropriate. See
Barker, supra note 11, at 452-53; Braun, supra note 221, at 1062-64; supra
note 221; see also Richard Zitrin & Carol M. Langford, Striking Back at
SLAPPs, THE RECORDER, Apr. 28, 1999, at 5 ("[C]urrent ethics rules do little
to discipline lawyers for filing a SLAPP. Adding teeth to anti-SLAPP laws
through significant disciplinary sanctions for lawyers guilty of filing them
would be a step in the right direction.").
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its very flawed database. Since the principal charge to the Judicial
Council was to report "on the frequency and outcome of special mo-
tions made pursuant to [section 425.16], ' '396 the flawed database
makes any conclusion in the report suspect, especially given that the
Judicial Council reaches the determination that all is copacetic. Yet,
as the consultants hired by the Judicial Council indicated more than
once in their analysis of the data, the Council's two key assumptions
are unsupported: (1) that anti-SLAPP motions to strike are uncom-
mon-a conclusion based primarily on a misconceived random court
docket search for one year in three counties that may not even be
representative of the locales where such cases are likely to be
filed;397 and (2) that what goes on at the trial court level is the same
as what goes on in a mere nineteen court of appeal decisions.398
The consultants had a real concern that the true picture had not been
seen by the Judicial Council's efforts, 399 and they tried to provide
396. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(i) (West Supp. 2000).
397. See supra Appendix 3, note 356.
398. See supra Appendix 3, note 361 and accompanying text.
399. The consultants were particularly struck by a comment made by one of
the responding attorneys who had represented SLAPPees in three other suits
besides Averill v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. App. 4th 1170, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 62
(Ct App. 1996). See JUDICIAL COUNCIL SLAPP REPORT, supra note 8, At-
tachment 2, at 6. That comment was:
In my view, Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16 is intended to be a
powerful tool in dealing with SLAPP suits. From my perspective,
however, there has been considerable reluctance by the trial courts to
grant special motions to strike. The summary nature of the proceeding
is, in my view, what causes the court's reluctance to grant these mo-
tions. It is my sense that judges feel it is unfair to plaintiffs to require
them to be able to prove a case at the outset without the benefit of ex-
tensive discovery. Because of the summary nature of the proceeding,
and because it occurs at the outset of the case, it is my impression that
judges are not enthused about granting these motions, but would rather
allow the case to proceed along the normal course.
Id., Attachment 8 (Letter from Robert A. Walker to Judicial Council of Cali-
fornia (Jan. 20, 1998)). The consultants reaction to this comment was:
This is a significant observation-that trial court judges are "reluc-
tanf' to dismiss SLAPPs-and is confirmed by our study [citing to
PRING & CANAN, supra note 29, Chap. 8 (on "Judicial Cures")].
Needless to say, such reluctance to dismiss would vitiate the Legisla-
ture's central purpose in adopting 425.16-to end the chill of SLAPPs
on public participation at as early a stage as possible.
See id., Attachment 2, at 6. The reluctance to grant a section 425.16 motion
April 2000]
886 LOYOLA OFLOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol. 33:801
recommendations to ensure problems did not exist. However, the
Judicial Council largely treated those recommendations with a cava-
lier attitude. Since the legislature has already adopted Recommen-
dations 1 and 4,400 one can assume that it is viewing the consultants'
recommendations with more seriousness. It is therefore likely that
there will be additional amendments to California's anti-SLAPP stat-
ute.4
0 1
before discovery by the trial judge, albeit by a federal district court judge, in
Rogers, 57 F. Supp. 2d 973, is palpable. That reluctance goes a long way in
explaining his misunderstanding of the significance of allowing broad discov-
ery in a SLAPP suit and his strained interpretation of Erie to find that the mo-
tion hearing timing and discovery provisions of section 425.16 conflicted with
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See supra notes 265-77 and accompa-
nying text
400. See supra Appendix 3, notes 354-55, 369 and accompanying text.
401. It is also expected that those in favor of amendments to enact these rec-
ommendations will continue lobbying efforts with the Legislature. See Tele-
phone Interview with Mark Goldowitz, supra note 296 (noting that the anti-
SLAPP coalition of supporters was growing stronger and stronger).
